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PERFECT HEDGE: ADDING PRECISION TO 
THE PROPOSED SEC RULE ON INVESTMENT 
COMPANY USE OF DERIVATIVES WITH A 
HEDGING EXCEPTION 
Abstract: Derivatives are complex financial instruments that derive their value 
from an underlying asset. Used and valued by commercial and financial institu-
tions, derivatives are booming. Indeed, the growing $600 trillion derivative mar-
ket dwarfs the $67 trillion stock market. Yet, the magnification effect of deriva-
tive leverage on losses has well-documented ties to the 2008 Financial Crisis 
when AIG, Lehman Brothers, and other financial institutions found themselves 
indebted on hundreds of billions of dollars in derivative transactions. Since the 
crisis, investment companies and funds constrained by the Investment Company 
Act to protect unsophisticated and vulnerable investors have increased their use 
of derivatives. In response to a dearth of regulation of investment company use 
of derivatives, the SEC introduced Proposed Rule 18f-4 in 2015. The proposed 
rule would control risky derivative use through mandating portfolio limitations, 
asset segregation requirements, the establishment of Derivative Risk Manage-
ment Programs, and additional recordkeeping requirements. The current wind in 
government, however, blows against such a rule. This Note argues that Proposed 
Rule 18f-4 should not be abandoned but rather implemented to prevent hazardous 
derivative use by investment companies. The rule, if implemented, should allow 
for the beneficial and vital use of hedging in its calculation of fund risk exposure 
and use expected shortfall instead of Value at Risk in making such a calculation. 
These augmentations to the rule would allow investment companies to benefit 
from derivatives and still follow the Investment Company Act’s goal of protect-
ing unsophisticated investors. 
INTRODUCTION 
Currently estimated to be over $600 trillion, the growing derivatives mar-
ket is up from $445 trillion in 2006 and is much larger than even the $67 tril-
lion global stock market.1 U.S. investment companies, who currently manage 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, EXCHANGE-TRADED FUTURES AND OPTIONS BY LOCA-
TION OF EXCHANGE 1 (2017) [hereinafter BIS, EXCHANGE-TRADED FUTURES] (providing statistics on 
the 2006 and 2016 exchange traded derivative market sizes); BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC 
DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2016, at 1 (2017) (providing statistics on 
the 2006 and 2016 over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivative market sizes); WORLD FED’N OF EXCHS., 
ANNUAL STATISTICS GUIDE 2016, at 1 (2017) (providing statistics on the global stock market). There 
are numerous definitions for derivatives, but the term has generally been defined as financial instru-
ments that derive their value from an underlying asset. See JOHN HULL & SANKARSHAN BASU, OP-
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over $19.5 trillion in assets—up from $11 trillion in 2006—are also enjoying 
substantial growth, both in the amount of assets held and number of firms.2 As 
they have continued to grow, investment companies funds (“funds”), such as 
mutual funds and exchange-traded-funds (“ETFs”), have increased their use of 
derivatives and innovatively engineered them.3 The U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) has pushed back on the risky use of derivatives 
by funds and proposed Rule 18f-4 in 2015 in an effort to bring fund derivative 
use under the purview of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”).4 
Derivatives have drawn immense criticism, reaching a crescendo with the 
2008 Financial Crisis.5 Financial calamities in the 1990s and early 2000s, such 
                                                                                                                           
TIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (9th ed. 2016) (defining “derivative”); see also infra 
notes 31–59 and accompanying text (providing an in-depth explanation of derivatives). 
 2 INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVI-
TIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 8–9 (57th ed. 2017) (providing statistics on fund 
holdings and number of firms in 2006 and 2016); see also PAUL HANOUNA ET AL., DIV. OF ECON. & 
RISK ANALYSIS, LIQUIDITY AND FLOWS OF U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS 1–2 (2015) (pointing out that mutu-
al funds experienced a 300% growth of assets under management from 2000 to 2014). Investment 
companies (“funds”) with less liquidity have also grown significantly within that time period. 
HANOUNA ET AL, supra, at 1. The Investment Company Act (“ICA”) generally defines investment 
companies as companies that issue securities and are chiefly in the “business of investing” in securi-
ties. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2012) (defining “investment company” under the ICA); see also 
infra notes 60–79 and accompanying text (providing an in-depth explanation of investment company). 
Private investment companies, such as hedge funds, typically meet requirements to be exempted from 
the ICA. Henry Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State Funds, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 295, 300 (2010). Some common fund complexes include BlackRock, Vanguard Group, and 
Fidelity Investments. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance 
and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L. J. 84, 92 (2010). 
 3 See DANIEL DELI ET AL., DIV. OF ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS, USE OF DERIVATIVES BY REGIS-
TERED INVESTMENT COMPANIES 2–3 (2015) (describing derivative development); Dan Awrey, Com-
plexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 
271–74 (2012) (explaining some particularly complex derivative uses by funds). In one random study 
of 10% of U.S. funds, alternative strategy funds, which typically employ a heavy use of derivatives, 
increased their assets from $320 billion in 2010 to $469 billion in 2014. DELI ET AL., supra, at 2, 21. 
 4 See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Com-
panies, Investment Company Act Release No. 31933, 112 SEC Docket 6625, at 9–13 (proposed Dec. 
11, 2015) [hereinafter Proposing Release] (explicitly addressing what abuses in the market spurned 
targeting derivative use). Derivative use by funds was not explicitly addressed in either the ICA or 
Release No 10666. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (making no mention of derivatives); Secu-
rities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 
10666, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,128 (Apr. 27, 1979) [hereinafter Release 10666] (targeting financial commit-
ment transactions). Later, however, the SEC addressed derivative use in numerous no-action letters. 
See Kelly S. Kibbie, Dancing with the Derivatives Devil: Mutual Funds’ Dangerous Liaison with 
Complex Investment Contracts and the Forgotten Lessons of 1940, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 195, 232–
35 (2013) (listing no-action letters addressing derivatives). No-action letters are SEC replies to re-
quests for guidance on whether a certain action meets the requirements of current law. THOMAS HA-
ZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:4[4] (7th ed. 2017). 
 5 See Brooksley Born, Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 237 (2011) (stating that derivatives were major role-players in the Financial 
Crisis); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 539, 588 (2011) (concluding that the 2008 Financial Crisis was accelerated by deriva-
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as Enron’s collapse, Long-Term Capital Management’s $4.6 billion loss, fol-
lowed by collapse, and Metallgesellschaft AG’s $1.3 billion loss were all tied 
to derivatives use.6 The 2008 Financial Crisis was accelerated by the use of 
derivatives by some major financial institutions, such as AIG and Lehman 
Brothers, who were unable to pay hundreds of billions in derivatives obliga-
tions as the housing bubble burst.7 Although the destructive systematic impact 
                                                                                                                           
tives); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 37 (2011) (arguing that the lack of regulation of derivatives caused the 2008 Financial Crisis); 
Editorial Board, The New Danger from Derivatives, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 7, 2016, at 2 (arguing that the 
exchanges that some derivatives are traded on face risks that could spread to other sectors); Tony Jack-
son, Crazy Crisis May Herald the End of New Derivative Folly, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2007), https://
 www.ft.com/content/69293026-b16e-11dc-9777-0000779fd2ac [https://perma.cc/M7T7-2RG4] (positing 
that the current market would be safer without derivatives). 
 6 See generally The Fall of Enron: How Could It Have Happened?: Hearing Before the Sen. 
Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 107th Cong. 376 (2002) [hereinafter Partnoy Testimony] (testimony of Frank 
Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law) (outlining how Enron traders 
used derivatives to hide losses); Alexia Brunet & Merideth Shafe, Beyond Enron: Regulation in Ener-
gy Derivatives Trading, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 665 (2007) (covering Enron’s abuse of deriva-
tives); Franklin Edwards, Derivatives Can Be Hazardous to Your Health: The Case of Metallgesell-
schaft, DERIVATIVES Q., Spring 1995, at 9, 9–13 (explaining the circumstances behind Metallgesell-
schaft’s losses); Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C.L. REV. 215 (2015) (demonstrat-
ing how derivatives can be used by benchmark manipulators to obtain gains); Michael Siconolfi et al., 
How Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed to Save Long-Term Capital, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 1998, 
12:13 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB911168945488412500 [https://perma.cc/T69L-RX7X] 
(explaining the circumstances behind the losses caused by Long-Term Capital Management’s deriva-
tive use). 
 7 See The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry 
Comm’n (2010) (statement of Michael Greenberger, Professor, University of Maryland School of 
Law) (transcript available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1036&context=cong_test [https://perma.cc/BQH4-B3UD]) (covering the rise of deregulated deriva-
tive use and its ties to the Financial Crisis); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT 279 (2011) (concluding that the massive losses of major financial institutions were due 
to derivatives); René Stulz, Financial Derivatives: Lessons from the Subprime Crisis, MILKEN INST. 
REV., First Quarter 2009, at 70 (linking derivatives to losses in the Financial Crisis); Tim Adam & 
Andre Guettler, The Use of Credit Default Swaps by U.S. Fixed-Income Mutual Funds 10 (Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp., Working Paper No. 2011-01, 2010) (stating that the use of certain derivatives caused substan-
tial losses at banks and funds during the Financial Crisis); Robert L. McDonald & Anna L. Paulson, 
AIG in Hindsight 12–18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21108, 2015) (explaining 
AIG’s derivative use). Alan Greenspan, the revered former chairman of the Federal Reserve, once 
championed the use of derivatives but recanted that view after the Financial Crisis. See FIN. CRISIS IN-
QUIRY COMM’N, supra, at 47–49 (quoting Greenspan as stating before the financial crisis that he believed 
the regulation of derivatives was “unnecessary” but then stated that he was “not opposed to the regulation 
of derivatives”). There were warning signs indicating that derivative use could cause problems. See id. at 
xxi (explaining some of the variables indicating dangers of derivative use prior to the Financial Cri-
sis); Born, supra note 5, at 5 (covering efforts to regulate derivatives prior to the Financial Crisis); 
Martin Mayer, The Dangers of Derivatives, BROOKINGS, May 20, 1999, at 2 (raising concerns with the 
use of derivatives prior to the Financial Crisis); René Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVE 173, 190 (2004) (outlining the dangers of derivatives in 2004); Letter from Warren 
Buffett, Chief Exec. Officer, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to S’holders of Berkshire Hathaway (Feb. 21, 
2003) (calling derivatives “weapons of mass destruction”) (on file with Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.). 
Brooksley Born, Chairwoman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, tirelessly pushed for 
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had already been felt, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, in part, to address select types of deriva-
tives in response to the massive losses sustained and calls for derivative regu-
lation.8 Even with regulations in place, worries still continue to surface about a 
repeat of the systemic failures of the 2008 Financial Crisis that were magnified 
by derivatives use.9 
Despite the risks, derivatives are seen as beneficial and important instru-
ments for capital markets.10 They allow for lower transaction costs and price 
discovery, improve liquidity, and can be tools for efficient market risk alloca-
                                                                                                                           
regulation but was rebutted by Alan Greenspan and Congress. See Richard B. Schmitt, The Born Proph-
ecy, 95-MAY ABA. J. 50, 55 (2009) (outlining Born’s fight for regulation and the push-back from the 
Treasury); Stout, supra note 5, at 20–21 (describing Born’s push for regulation). Born continues to 
advocate for derivative regulation. See Born, supra note 5, at 242–43 (advocating for greater deriva-
tive regulation). 
 8 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (regulating certain derivatives); Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial 
Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Desta-
bilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 
127, 152–55 (2011) (outlining how the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) was intended to regulate certain derivatives). Systemic risk is all “non-business spe-
cific risk.” JEFFREY HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (2014). Specifically, it is the risk that an economic 
tremor will result in market losses or losses to financial institutions that lead to increases in the cost of 
capital. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 204 (2008). 
 9 See OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, ASSET MANAGEMENT & FINANCIAL STABILITY 18–19 (2013) 
(finding that current use of derivatives poses risks to financial stability); Colleen M. Baker, Regulat-
ing the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1292 
(2010) (arguing for more transparency of derivative use due to their possible systemic impact); Mi-
chael Simkovic, Paving the Way for the Next Financial Crisis, 29 NO. 3 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP. 1, 2, 6 (2010) (arguing that concerns remain about the regulation of OTC derivatives); 
John Dizard, Derivatives Market Is Short of a $3.7tn Lifeboat, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://
www.ft.com/content/1726ae08-eee9-11e6-930f-061b01e23655 [https://perma.cc/6KBT-P4ZV] (stat-
ing that the OTC derivative market is under-collateralized at about $3.69 trillion); Mayra Rodríguez 
Valladares, Derivatives Markets Growing Again, with Few New Protections, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(May 13, 2014, 4:35 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/derivatives-markets-growing-
again-with-few-new-protections/ [https://perma.cc/9CUW-8ATY] (highlighting the concentration of 
derivatives in few financial institutions). In the instances of Bear Sterns, AIG, and Long-Term Capital 
Management, all had numerous outstanding derivatives contracts that would have shifted back to their 
counterparties and had an immense effect on the markets. ALAN RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MAR-
KETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW 160 (2009); see also infra note 36 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining derivative counterparties). 
 10 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 9–13 (acknowledging the multiple uses of derivatives); 
MICHAEL CHUI, IFC BULLETIN NO. 35, DERIVATIVES MARKETS, PRODUCTS AND PARTICIPANTS: AN 
OVERVIEW 3 (Feb. 2012) (listing the benefits of derivatives); Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instru-
ments: Lessons for the Regulatory State, 21 J. CORP. L. 69, 72–81 (1995) (listing the benefits of deriv-
atives); Shelly Antoniewicz, Derivatives—Please Don’t Let Them Be Misunderstood, INV. CO. INST. 
(Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_16_derivatives_imf [https://perma.cc/28J9-
K874] (arguing that there are many benefits that can be derived by using derivatives); see also infra 
notes 31–106 (covering the variety of uses of derivatives). 
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tion.11 Funds specifically benefit through the ability to hedge risks and maxim-
ize gains on investments.12 Although derivative use has received immense crit-
icism, oversimplifications of measurements, incomplete data, and quick con-
clusions can muddy risk delineations between different derivative uses.13 
The inherent risk in derivative use still persists, however, and is of partic-
ular concern to the SEC when funds, which are accessible to unsophisticated 
and vulnerable investors, utilize them.14 Additionally, there has been no formal 
SEC guidance on fund use of derivatives since 1979, and even then, deriva-
tives were not explicitly addressed.15 With the 2008 Financial Crisis fresh in 
regulators’ minds, a growing derivatives market, an influx of investment com-
pany use of derivatives, and evidence suggesting that funds pose systemic risk, 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See HAAS, supra note 8, at 119 (explaining the beneficial uses of derivative hedging); 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 159–60 (explaining that derivatives are a means to shift risk to 
parties who are willing to take it on or are better suited to take it on and that derivatives lower fund 
costs, allow for hedging, help manage assets, and increase profits); Macey, supra note 10, at 72–76 
(stating that derivatives allow parties to shift risk); Keith Sill, The Economic Benefits and Risks of 
Derivative Securities, BUS. REV., Jan. 1997, at 15, 20 (explaining that derivatives help spread risk). 
Derivatives also enjoy special treatment in bankruptcy. See Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morri-
son, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. REG. 91, 95 
(2005) (explaining that that derivatives counterparties are prevented from terminating them during 
bankruptcy). 
 12 See COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SEC., ABA, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INVEST-
MENT COMPANY USE OF DERIVATIVES AND LEVERAGE 6 (2010) (outlining how funds benefit from 
derivatives); Kibbie, supra note 4, at 208–09 (outlining how funds benefit from derivatives); Terry 
Tian, The Use of Derivatives in Mutual Funds, MORNINGSTAR, Apr. 18, 2012, at 1 (stating that mutu-
al funds use derivatives to manage risk); Antoniewicz, supra note 10 (finding that there are many 
benefits for funds from derivatives). 
 13 See INV. CO. INST., 2016 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND 
ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY, at ix (56th ed. 2016) (highlighting com-
mon misconceptions about derivatives); Lisa Pollack, How NOT to Argue That Derivatives Are the 
Devil’s Spawn, FIN. TIMES (June 13, 2012), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/06/13/1041931/how-not-
to-argue-that-derivatives-are-the-devils-spawn/ [https://perma.cc/P7A5-EF6U] (criticizing another 
news outlet’s conclusions about derivatives because they “cherry-picked” support); Antoniewicz, 
supra note 10 (highlighting common misconceptions about derivatives). 
 14 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42 (2012) (granting power to SEC to investigate violations of and enforce 
the ICA); Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1, 5 (2011) (describing derivatives as inherently maintaining the ability to magnify losses). The 
general purpose of the laws governing funds is to protect individual investors. See Herpich v. Wallace, 
430 F.2d 792, 816 (5th Cir. 1970) (“The history and whole pattern of the Investment Company Act 
convince us that Congress by this statute intended to deter mismanagement of investment companies 
for the protection of investment company security holders . . . .”); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 
378 F.2d 783, 795 (8th Cir. 1967) (stating that the ICA “was primarily aimed at the protection of indi-
viduals who purchase the security issued by the investment company”). The ICA specifically limits 
fund use of leverage, a characteristic of many derivatives. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(h) (regulating fund 
leverage); see also infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text (discussing leverage). 
 15 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 19. The guidance has been limited to Release 10666 and 
no-action letters. Id. Mary Jo White, the former SEC Chair, stated at the time of Rule 18f-4’s proposal 
that the existing regulations did not sufficiently carry out the objectives of the ICA. Mary Jo White, 
Chair, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting (Dec. 11, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.sec.
gov/news/statement/chair-white-statement-at-open-meeting.html [https://perma.cc/3MWU-GMYF]). 
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the SEC has taken a more aggressive regulatory approach to protect inves-
tors.16 In 2015, the SEC proposed Rule 18f-4, its most comprehensive rule 
governing fund use of derivatives.17 There are six regulatory components to 
Rule 18f-4: (1) portfolio limitations; (2) asset segregation; (3) the Derivatives 
Risk Management Program; (4) requirements for Financial Commitment 
Transactions; (5) recordkeeping; and (6) amendments to proposed SEC forms 
N-PORT and N-CEN.18 
The mutual fund industry, as well as Michael Piwowar, then Acting 
Chairman of the SEC and now a Commissioner on the SEC, criticized the pro-
posal as lacking flexibility and possessing imprecise definitions.19 Critics, 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 1–2 (outlining the reasoning behind Proposed Rule 18f-
4); OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 9, at 18 (stating that failure of a large asset management firm 
could pose a risk to the financial system). There has been an upward trend in SEC enforcement actions 
between 2014 and 2016, with 2016 being an exceptional year for SEC enforcement. Jessica Dye, US 
Securities Regulators Tout Another Record Year for Enforcement, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), https://
www.ft.com/content/65676ae6-670c-3c9a-8c0b-7b32ed43d3d8 [https://perma.cc/X2U9-XPRH]. 
 17 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 1 (proposing a comprehensive rule on derivatives); David 
C. Sullivan, Proposed Rule on Registered Funds’ Use of Derivatives, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV-
ERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 17, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/17/proposed-rule-on-
registered-funds-use-of-derivatives/ [https://perma.cc/EV6Z-GG6J] (summarizing key aspects of 
Proposed Rule 18f-4). Proposed Rule 18f-4, if approved as a Final Rule by the SEC, would supplant a 
substantial amount of former no-action letters and SEC guidance. See Proposing Release, supra note 4, 
at 54 (listing the regulations that 18f-4 would replace). The Proposed Rule can become a Final Rule 
only after it is voted on by the SEC Commission. See Fast Answers: Rulemaking, How It Works, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersrulemakinghtm.html [https://perma.cc/5LAU-XECF] (provid-
ing a short explanation of the rulemaking process). 
 18 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 51–54 (summarizing the main components of the Proposed 
Rule 18f-4). Proposed forms N-PORT and N-CEN were introduced on May 20, 2015 in an attempt to 
modernize fund disclosure. Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-9776, Exchange Act Release No. 34-75,002, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,610, 80 
Fed. Reg. 33,590 (proposed June 12, 2015). 
 19 See, e.g., Fidelity Management & Research Company, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Re-
garding the Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies (Mar. 28, 2016) [hereinafter 
Fidelity Comment Letter] (advocating for the allowance of hedging in exposure calculation) (on file 
with the SEC); Vanguard, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Use of Derivatives by Registered In-
vestment Companies (Mar. 28, 2016) (advocating for an expansion of qualifying coverage assets and 
recognition of offsetting transactions) (on file with the SEC); Joe Rennison, Mutual Funds Hit Back at 
SEC Proposal to Limit Derivative Use, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
cb563284-f5fe-11e5-96db-fc683b5e52db [https://perma.cc/S8VB-CZWW] (outlining some of the 
responses by mutual funds to the Proposed Rule and highlighting that a recent study found that 471 
funds with $613 billion in assets would not meet the requirements of the proposed rule); Michael 
Piwowar, Comm’r, SEC, Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Use of Derivatives by Registered 
Investment Companies (Dec. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Piwowar Statement] (transcript available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/piwowar-dissenting-statement-use-of-derivatives-funds.html 
[https://perma.cc/JY5G-ZZ77]) (stating that he could not support the proposed rule because the SEC 
did not do a high-quality analysis of comprehensive data on fund use of derivatives); Letter from 
Barbara Novivk, Vice Chairman, BlackRock, to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-15/s72415-266.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKT2-WF5R] (advocat-
ing for an expansion of what constitutes qualifying covering assets). 
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however, conceded that there is a need for updated regulations.20 The change 
in presidential administrations in 2016, however, has turned the tide against 
regulation generally, leaving Proposed Rule 18f-4’s fate up in the air.21 This 
Note argues that Proposed Rule 18f-4 should be implemented in order to pro-
tect investors and the national public but should be modified to allow for the 
beneficial use of hedging in its calculation of fund exposure to risks.22 
Part I of this Note discusses the current use of derivatives by funds and 
the current regulatory scheme.23 Part II explores the provisions set out by Pro-
posed Rule 18f-4.24 Part III argues that Proposed Rule 18f-4 serves as a neces-
sary starting point for the regulation of derivative use by funds, but must be 
tailored in some of its key components to allow funds to simultaneously bene-
fit investors and adequately protect unsophisticated investors.25 
I. FUND DERIVATIVE USE AND THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME 
Derivatives and funds have long-held significance in U.S. financial mar-
kets predating the Great Depression.26 In the past few years, however, invest-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Fidelity Comment Letter, supra note 19, at 2 (supporting updated regulations); Daisy Max-
ey, Seeking More Clarity on Derivatives in Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2015, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/seeking-more-clarity-on-derivatives-in-mutual-funds-1434376452 
[https://perma.cc/ZB7Q-4M33] (finding that funds generally supported an update of regulations); 
Dave Michaels, Here Come ETF Regulations (and Why the Industry Is Happy About It), WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 6, 2017, 4:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/here-come-etf-regulations-and-why-the-
industry-is-happy-about-it-1488770041 [https://perma.cc/NQE3-W3EW] (quoting the Chief Execu-
tive of the Investment Company Institute as believing that “a well-drawn up rule on derivatives would 
be a good one”); Piwowar Statement, supra note 19, at 1 (stating the need for updated regulations). 
 21 See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (requiring that two existing 
regulations be identified as “to be repealed” when an agency or executive department proposes notice 
and comment); Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017) (setting out the “Core Prin-
ciples” of regulation for the Trump administration and ordering the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council to report on current regulations). Though Dodd-Frank has been targeted as a regulation that 
could be scaled back in the coming years, the U.S. derivatives industry is not necessarily in favor of a 
complete return to pre-Financial Crisis regulation. See Joe Rennison & Phillip Stafford, US Deriva-
tives Industry Anticipates Modest Dodd-Frank Changes, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.ft.
com/content/1f6ccfbe-ed2e-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6 [https://perma.cc/MV4H-FLNT] (pointing out 
that chief executives of exchanges do not think a total repeal of the law is prudent). The current SEC 
Chairman, Jay Clayton, is a former Wall Street lawyer. Dave Michaels, Jay Clayton Confirmed as SEC 
Chairman, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2017, 6:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jay-clayton-confirmed-
as-sec-chairman-1493763672 [https://perma.cc/NK5V-6YCM]; see also Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, 
Remarks at the Economic Club of New York (July 12, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/remarks-economic-club-new-york [https://perma.cc/ND2W-34WE]) (speaking on 
his policy views). 
 22 See infra notes 184–226 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 26–106 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 107–183 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 184–226 and accompanying text. 
 26 See CLIFFORD KIRSCH, MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS REGULATION § 1A:1 
n.3 (3d ed. 2013) (stating that the funds began to flourish in the 1920s but had been established in the 
United States in the 1800s); see also Stout, supra note 5, at 11–17 (tracing the history of derivatives in 
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ment volumes in both have reached unprecedented heights.27 This Part ex-
plores the current use of derivatives by funds and the existing regulatory guid-
ance.28 Section A provides an explanation of derivatives and funds and dis-
cusses how funds currently utilize derivatives.29 Section B examines the cur-
rent SEC regulations that govern fund use of derivatives that Rule 18f-4 seeks 
to replace.30 
A. Expansion of Fund Use of Derivatives 
1. Derivatives 
Legal practitioners and academics alike have difficulty explaining deriva-
tives.31 Generally, derivatives are financial instruments that derive their value 
from an underlying asset.32 They are bilateral contracts between counterparties 
who each take opposing positions, with each party contracting to buy, sell, or 
transfer an asset at a certain date in the future.33 Derivatives are aleatory con-
                                                                                                                           
the United States); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 
Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Feb. 21, 1997) (transcript availa-
ble at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?item_id=8587&filepath=/files/docs/historical/greenspan/
Greenspan_19970221.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5BH-JQ6Z]) (outlining some of the major developments in 
derivatives history in the United States). The 1990s saw an explosion of derivative use, with Alan Green-
span remarking in 1999 that “[b]y far the most significant event in finance during the past decade has 
been the extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives.” Alan Greenspan, Chairmen, 
Federal Reserve Bank, Address at Futures Industry Association Conference (Mar. 1999). 
 27 See BIS, EXCHANGE-TRADED FUTURES, supra note 1, at 1 (showing an increase in the deriva-
tives market from less than $100 trillion to more than $700 trillion between the 1990s and 2010s); 
INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 9 (presenting statistics on immense fund growth). Funds have become 
important choices for retirement plans, with mutual funds managing 63% of 401(k) plans. See 
KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1A:2.5[C]; Retirement Assets Total $27.2 Trillion in Third Quarter 2017, 
INV. CO. INST. (DEC. 20, 2017), https://www.ici.org/research/stats/retirement/ret_17_q3 [https://perma.
cc/WEZ8-X7US] (providing data on retirement assets). Currently, over 43% of U.S. households invest 
in mutual funds. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 112. 
 28 See infra notes 31–106 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 31–91 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 92–106 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Lynch, supra note 14, at 9 (explaining that many practitioners misunderstand derivatives). 
There are numerous definitions of derivatives that are similar to the one presented, which lends cre-
dence to the struggle scholars have in defining the term. See id. at 16 n.39 (listing nine different defi-
nitions of derivatives by scholars). 
 32 See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 1 (defining “derivatives”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Deriva-
tive Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 734 (2002) (same); Lynch, supra 
note 14, at 5 (same). The “underlying asset” need not be a physical asset that can be possessed. See 
HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that derivatives can be based on practically any variable). 
Indeed, many derivatives are based on events such as credit derivatives, weather derivatives, and in-
terest rate derivatives. See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 1 (listing different types of assets that de-
rivatives are based upon); Lynch, supra note 14, at 24 (same). 
 33 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (stat-
ing that a derivatives transaction is a “bilateral contract or payments exchange agreement whose value 
derives . . . from the value of an underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index”) (internal 
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tracts, meaning that the outcome is based on an event that the counterparties 
have no control over.34 Derivatives typically come in four different forms: 
forwards, futures, options, and swaps.35 One of the simplest derivative transac-
tions is a future.36 For example, if Trader A wishes to enter into a three-month 
futures contract in January to buy 100 pounds of wheat at $0.15 per pound (the 
long position), Trader B will contract to sell the 100 pounds of wheat at $0.15 
at the end of the three-month period (the short position).37 If the price of wheat 
during that time increases above $0.15, then trader A will buy the wheat at a 
discounted price and be able to then sell it for a profit and if the price of wheat 
drops below $0.15 then trader B will be selling the wheat at an above market 
price.38 
                                                                                                                           
quotations omitted); WALLACE TURBEVILLE, DEMOS, DERIVATIVES, INNOVATION IN THE ERA OF 
FINANCIAL DEREGULATION 8–9 (2013) (“[A] bilateral contract between two parties, requiring per-
formance in the future.”). Counterparties are not in the position to have an effect on the event. Lynch, 
supra note 14, at 17–18. Derivatives are often zero-sum in that they redistribute wealth to one party 
rather than create value. Id. at 18–19. If used for hedging, derivatives can create value by offering 
insurance. Id. at 18–19. Derivatives are either deliverable or non-deliverable based on the physical na-
ture of the asset. Id. at 17–18. Even if a derivative is deliverable, the holder might not want to deliver 
the underlying asset. Id. at 17–18. Other holders may want actual physical delivery of the asset. See id. 
at 17–18. In the case where the holder does not want to deliver the underlying asset, the contract is 
cash settled. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 857. Cash settlement means that the counterparty pays 
the intrinsic value of the derivative. HAAS, supra note 8, at 123. 
 34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (defining 
“aleatory contract”); Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Specu-
lative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 67, 71 (2011) (same). 
 35 See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 6–20 (covering the different types of basic derivatives). 
Forward contracts are agreements to sell or buy an asset at a certain price at a certain date. See id. at 6. 
Futures contracts are similar to forward contracts in that they are contracts to buy or sell an asset at a 
certain price at a certain date but are more often traded on an exchange. Id. at 8. Unlike forwards and 
futures, options contracts do not obligate the trader to exercise the contract, but rather give the trader a 
right to exercise the contract. Id. at 9. Forwards and futures also do not usually require upfront pay-
ment. Id. at 7. Options are divided into two types: call options and put options. Id. at 8. A call option 
gives the trader the right to buy for a certain price at a certain date and a put option gives the trader the 
right to sell for a certain price at a certain date. Id. In the United States, an option holder has the right 
to execute up to any time before the expiration date. Id. at 9. For example, Trader A wishes to enter 
into a call option in month one. See id. The exchange will list a strike or exercise price, the price of the 
underlying asset to be sold or bought when the buyer of the option exercises the option, and the price 
of the option to buy at that price for a certain period of time. See id. at 9. In month one, Trader A will 
choose which strike price (say, $100) he or she wishes to buy the assets (100 shares of stock) that 
matures or expires on a certain date, in this case one year. See id. Trader A will then pay the exchange 
the cost of the listed contracts, in this case $10 for the right to buy each share or $1000 total for the 
right to buy 100 shares. See id. Trader A will exercise the call option if the price of each share rises 
above $100 before the year period. See id. If it does not rise above $100 Trader A will not exercise the 
right to buy and will lose the $1000. See id. Swaps are more complicated derivatives that are contracts 
to exchange cash flows of typically an interest or exchange rate at a certain date. Id. at 175. 
 36 See id. at 8 (explaining futures contracts). In a futures contract, one party seeks to buy an asset, 
called the long position, and the other party seeks to sell, called the short position. Id. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. 
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Derivatives are traded either on exchanges or over-the-counter 
(“OTC”).39 Exchange traded derivatives are those traded on regulated ex-
changes such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of 
Trade, or the Minneapolis Grain Exchange.40 The exchange regulates the con-
tracts between the parties, serves to keep the market orderly, and mitigates 
risk.41 OTC derivatives are negotiated and entered into off of regulated ex-
changes through either another party (called a central counterparty), or solely 
between the two traders (called a bilateral trade).42 
One of the most common uses of derivatives is to hedge the risk of an as-
set or another derivatives contract.43 For example, an option gives the trader 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id. at 1–2 (explaining the distinction between exchange-traded and OTC derivatives); 
Lynch, supra note 14, at 30 (same); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 162 (finding that the 
distinction was made by the United States Treasury). 
 40 See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 2 (listing exchanges); Lynch, supra note 14, at 30 (same). 
Exchange-traded derivatives provide a “central marketplace,” “standardized terms,” and “constant 
maturity.” RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 163. Originally, exchanges were open outcry systems 
where traders would perform the transactions on a physical floor, but electronic trading is becoming 
increasingly popular. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 3. 
 41 See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining derivative exchanges); Norman Menachem 
Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 717–18 
(same). The exchange clearinghouse acts as a middle party between the two trading counterparties. 
HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 3. Instead of the traders directly dealing with each other, they take a 
side opposite of the contract with the clearinghouse. Id. For example, if a Trader A wishes to enter 
into the long position of a futures contract on an exchange, the clearinghouse will take the short posi-
tion. See id. The clearinghouse will then take the long position in the contract with trader B who is 
taking the short position. See id. This method decreases the counterparty risk of parties not holding up 
their end of the contract. Id. Counterparty risk is the risk that a counterparty defaults on its obligation 
and the related risk of having many derivatives transactions with one counterparty. Id. at 208. 
 42 See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 3, 46 (explaining OTC derivatives transactions and central 
counterparties); Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and 
the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1457 (1993) (expressing worries 
about the OTC market); Jeremy Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: 
Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
49, 65 (2011) (listing the benefits of OTC derivatives). The OTC market allows for flexible contract 
terms. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 163. Central counterparties perform a role similar to that of 
the exchange by taking the counterparty position for each trader. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 46. 
When the transaction is completed only between the two traders, it is called a bilateral clearance. Id. 
OTC deals typically include a collateral requirement to cover the value of the contract. Id. 
 43 See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 11; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 163–65; Erik F. 
Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Missing Macroeconomic Dimen-
sion, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 37 (2011) [hereinafter Gerding, Credit Derivatives] (explaining hedg-
ing); Lynch, supra note 14, at 38. Hedging is commonly done with forwards and options contracts. 
See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 13 (noting common hedging derivatives). Forward contracts 
hedge risk by locking in the trader to buy or sell at a certain price. See id. Hedging, in the context of 
Credit Default Swaps, does not always result in a full mitigation of risk. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, 
Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 865 (2014) (stating that perfect hedges are near impossible); Edwin Patter-
son, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges, 40 YALE L. J., 843, 878 (1930) (finding that 
courts struggle with the distinction). Hedging, however, is viewed as vital to the marketplace. Erik F. 
Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models 
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insurance while still allowing the trader to attain financial gain.44 Consider 
Trader A, who wishes to hedge against the risk that the price of her 100 shares 
dips to below $10.45 By entering into a put option to sell the 100 shares at $10, 
Trader A ensures that she will be able to sell at $10 if the stock drops below 
that point at the maturity date.46 Derivatives can hedge pre-existing risk such 
as credit and lending risk and therefore eventuate certain financing arrange-
ments that would not have otherwise occurred.47 When a trader uses deriva-
tives not to hedge risk but to gain a spot in the market or stake on a certain 
event, they are partaking in the controversial speculative use of derivative.48 
Often requiring little or no deposit to secure obligations, derivatives can 
be greatly leveraged.49 Leverage refers to the investment strategy by which 
investors are able to achieve a return on capital that is substantially greater 
than what they initially contributed.50 Leverage acts as a magnifier, giving in-
                                                                                                                           
and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 195 (2009) [hereinafter Gerding, Code, 
Crash, and Open Source] (“[T]hese instruments, including securitizations and credit derivatives, ena-
ble companies to reduce their cost of capital by disaggregating the residual risk traditionally borne by 
shareholders; companies can then offload these risks to more efficient risk bearers.”); Ronald J. Gilson 
& Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete 
Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 252 (2008) (“A company will use risk management in-
struments to transfer those risks that counterparties can manage at lower cost . . . .”). 
 44 HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 11. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. at 12–14; Lynch, supra note 14, at 38–41. Hedging against pre-existing risk is mitigating 
the risk of a certain event occurring, such as the price of wheat falling. See Lynch supra note 14, at 40. 
Credit risk can be hedged by taking a swap that provides the hedger with the right to receive payment 
if a default occurs. Id. A lender can hedge risk by requiring the debtor to enter into a futures contract 
that fixes their position. Id. 
 48 See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 14; Lynch, supra note 34, at 129–30 (arguing that specula-
tive derivatives contracts are the most dangerous because they resemble betting). Purely speculative 
derivatives are sometimes viewed as zero-sum transactions that do nothing more than transfer wealth. 
Lynch, supra note 34, at 73. 
 49 See KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.1 (noting the leverage involved with derivatives); 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 160 (same). Leverage is often used synonymously with the term 
debt. HAAS, supra note 8, at 157. This is especially true for derivatives contracts that do not require an 
upfront payment or margin account. See Andrew Ang et al., Hedge Fund Leverage 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16801, 2011); Gerding, Credit Derivatives, supra note 43, at 
41–42. “The margin is a cash amount required as a deposit for an option or future trade.” HULL & 
BASU, supra note 1, at 867. A margin account is where funds are deposited, the amount required will 
increase or decrease as the value of the underlying asset increases or decreases. Id. at 42. The daily 
adjustment is called marking to market or daily settlement. Id. 
 50 See Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,129 n.5 (explaining derivative leverage); HAAS, supra 
note 8, at 157 (same); KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.1 (same). Leverage increases with the increase 
in the amount of debt that a company maintains. HAAS, supra note 8, at 157. There are two types of 
leverage, indebtedness leverage and economic leverage. KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.1. Indebted-
ness leverage occurs when a derivative creates an obligation or potential indebtedness to a person 
other than the shareholders. Id. Economic leverage is when the derivative gives the right to a gain or a 
loss that exceeds the initial investment but requires no payment obligation above the initial invest-
ment. Id. 
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vestors the ability to attain immense gains but also great losses, as seen in the 
Great Depression and the 2008 Financial Crisis.51 For example, if Trader A 
invests $100 in shares of Stock A with solely her own equity and later sells her 
shares at $200, she realizes a 100% return on her initial investment.52 If she 
instead invests $20 and borrows the $80 of the $100 Stock A purchase price 
and later sells the shares at $200, she realizes a 500% gain on her initial $20 
investment.53 A loss operates in the same manner.54 Derivative leverage simi-
larly amplifies gains or losses that can far exceed the initial investment be-
cause there is little or no initial investment made on the transaction.55 
The acceleration of the failures of financial institutions during the 1990s, 
early 2000s, and the 2008 Financial Crisis highlighted the derivative counter-
party and systemic risk created by derivative leverage and speculation.56 Coun-
terparty risk—the risk of a counterparty defaulting on the contract—links to 
systemic risk when the amount and number of losses caused by a derivatives 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128 (noting the loss potential of derivatives due to lev-
erage); KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.1 (same); Kibbie, supra note 4, at 203 (covering the role of 
derivatives in the 2008 Financial Crisis); Azam Ahmed, As One JPMorgan Trader Sold Risk Con-
tracts, Another One Bought Them, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 15, 2012, 8:46 PM), https://deal
book.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/as-one-jpmorgan-trader-sold-risky-contracts-another-one-bought-them/ 
[https://perma.cc/YT5M-Q6J2] (covering J.P. Morgan’s $2 billion loss caused by the company’s mu-
tual funds use of derivatives). Warren Buffet regularly used leverage to attain immense successes that 
surpassed many hedge fund performances. See Andrea Franzini et al., Buffets Alpha 24 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19681, 2013). On the other side of JP Morgan’s losses were 
hedge funds that had taken counterparty positions on the contracts. Ahmed, supra, at 1. 
 52 See HAAS, supra note 8, at 157 (explaining leverage). 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SEC., supra note 12, at 8 (explaining derivative leverage); 
KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.1 (same); RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 160 (same). Leverage 
allows a trader to use capital on other assets rather than cover the derivative obligation. Gerding, 
Credit Derivatives, supra note 43, at 41. For example, a fund enters into one hundred long futures 
contracts to buy Stock A for $10 per share in three months. See id. Remember that futures contracts do 
not involve payment for the contract up front. See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 7. If the futures 
contracts mature and Stock A’s spot price has sprung up to $20, the fund can make a 100% return on 
its investment after it sells the shares. See id. If the spot price is $1, then there has been a 90% loss. 
See id. By using no initial investment, the fund can incur both the gains and losses. See id. This would 
be considered indebtedness leverage. See KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.1. If the fund were to have 
bought call options, where there is an initial investment to purchase the right to buy, it likewise could 
attain gains and losses in excess of its initial investment. See id. This would be considered economic 
leverage. See id. 
 56 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 7, at 279 (concluding that the massive losses of 
major financial institutions were, in part, due to derivatives); Lynch, supra note 34, at 84–94; Stulz, 
supra note 7, at 70 (linking derivatives to losses in the Financial Crisis); Adam & Guettler, supra note 
7, at 1 (stating that the use of certain derivatives caused substantial losses at banks and funds during the 
Financial Crisis); McDonald & Paulson, supra note 7, at 12–18 (explaining AIG’s derivative use); see 
also Dan Fitzpatrick et al., J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion Blunder, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2012, 12:47 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304070304577396511420792008 [https://perma.cc/
F295-ZQPC] (covering J.P. Morgan’s over $2 billion loss caused by derivative use). 
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default could impact the greater financial system.57 In 1998, Long-Term Capi-
tal Management, a hedge fund leveraged twenty-eight to one due to the use of 
derivatives, required a government bailout because of counterparty and sys-
temic risk after losing $40 billion in assets over the course of a year.58 During 
the 2008 Financial Crisis, Bear Stearns, AIG, and Lehman Brothers would 
have defaulted on derivatives transactions that posed immense counterparty 
risk and ultimately would have had substantial successive effects on the eco-
nomic system if not for government intervention.59 
2. Investment Companies 
Considered a vital part of the financial services sector, funds are generally 
defined as financial intermediaries that raise capital from investors, invest that 
capital in other establishments, and then issue securities that give investors an 
interest in the investments.60 Investors typically use funds as investment vehi-
                                                                                                                           
 57 See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 161 (covering counterparty risk in the derivative con-
text). Systemic risk is all non-business specific risk. HAAS, supra note 8, at 3. Specifically, it is the 
risk that an economic tremor will result in market losses or losses to financial institutions that lead to 
increases in the cost of capital. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 204. 
 58 See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LES-
SONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 29 (1999) (covering Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment’s losses); Siconolfi et al., supra note 6, at 1 (same); see also ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENI-
US FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (providing a com-
prehensive overview of Long-Term Capital Management’s actions). Having leverage of 28 to 1 means 
that Long-Term Capital Management was indebted on derivatives contracts 28 times the amount of 
actual capital that the fund owned. See Gerding, Credit Derivatives, supra note 43, at 41 (explaining 
leverage). 
 59 See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in Glob-
al Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 683 (2010) (connecting derivatives to the Financial 
Crisis); John E. Marthinsen, Derivative Scandals and Disasters, in FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: PRICING 
AND RISK MANAGEMENT, at 313, 313–14 (Robert W. Kolb & James A. Overdahl eds., 2010) (explain-
ing derivatives involvement with AIG and Bear Sterns); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 943 (2009) (explaining AIG’s bailout). 
 60 See RICHARD CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 643 (5th ed. 2013) 
(explaining the importance of funds); KIRSCH, supra note 26, §§ 1:1, 1B:1 (highlighting the im-
portance of funds); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2012) (defining “investment company” under the 
ICA). Whether a company is considered an investment company under the ICA often turns on whether 
the company is “primarily engaged in business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.” See 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (defining investment company); H. Norman Knickle, The Investment Company Act 
of 1940: SEC Enforcement and Private Actions, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 777, 783 (2004) 
(covering investment companies). Hedge funds and private equity funds are typically exempt from the 
ICA. See Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers: The Investment Company Act as a Reg-
ulatory Screen, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286, 287 (2008) (covering hedge funds); Robert S. Reder et 
al., Private Equity Funds: The Development of the Secondary Market, 9 No. 12 ANDREWS DERIVA-
TIVES LITIG. REP. 11, 11 (2003) (stating that private equity funds generally use the 100-investor ex-
emption, which generally allows a private fund to be exempt from investment company status if the 
fund has no more than 100 investors). 
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cles to diversify their portfolios and take advantage of skillful administration 
of their portfolios.61 
As public investment companies who sell their shares to the general public, 
funds are registered and structurally regulated under the ICA, and their activities 
are regulated by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934.62 Accordingly, funds must register under both the ICA and the Securi-
ties Act of 1933.63 Additionally, funds must identify themselves as diversified or 
non-diversified and are bound by certain liquidity requirements.64 
Generally organized as corporations, funds maintain a board of directors 
and are owned by shareholders.65 The portfolio management, however, is not 
run by employees but by third party advisors, called investment advisors.66 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See THOMAS HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.1 (2011) (outlining why investors look to 
funds); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 
2008 (2010) (finding that mutual funds are relatively safe for retail investors); Roberta S. Karmel, 
Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 914 (2005) 
(exploring rationale for choosing funds); The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L. J. 440, 
440 (1941) (describing why investors look to funds). 
 62 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (requiring registration under § 8 of the ICA); id. § 77e (2012) (setting 
forth the registration requirements under the Securities Act); id. § 78a–qq (2012 & Supp. III 2015, 
Supp. IV 2016) (setting forth the rules under which securities can be purchased and sold under the 
Exchange Act); John Morley, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 343, 345–55 
(2013) (explaining registration under the ICA). The ICA does not require investors of investment 
companies to be sophisticated or accredited. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (not requiring a 
sophisticated or accredited status). Sophisticated investors have sufficient knowledge in financial 
areas that they can evaluate risks. See generally SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) 
(providing a foundational definition of sophisticated investor). Accredited investors are those inves-
tors defined under rule 501 of the Securities Act of 1933 that have either a minimum income of 
$200,000 or have a net worth of $1 million. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2017) (defining accredited in-
vestor). 
 63 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(a) (requiring registration for funds); id. § 77e(c) (requiring the filing of a 
registration statement); Knickle, supra note 60, at 784 (covering registration requirements). Registra-
tion requires the disclosure of extensive information that the SEC will review. See id. § 80a-8(b). 
These requirements include registering with the SEC, filing notice of registration, filing a registration 
statement that includes policies, providing semiannual reports, undergoing audits, and keeping certain 
records. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 655 (listing the requirements). 
 64 KIRSCH, supra note 26, §§ 1:4.3, 33:2. Diversification turns on whether the management com-
pany meets the ICA requirement that certain percentages of the value of assets be represented by cer-
tain types of assets. Id. § 33:2. A fund must generally have their investments in no greater than 15% of 
illiquid assets. Id. § 1:4.2[F]. Liquidity refers to the ability of the asset to be sold. HULL & BASU, 
supra note 1, at 867. 
 65 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 651; KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1:2.1; Karmel, supra note 61, 
at 914–15. A corporation is a distinct legal entity that is owned by shareholders, who select the board 
of directors to manage the entity. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 7.1, § 9:1, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2017). Funds must maintain a board of 
directors. KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1:2.1. The board must maintain a 40% membership of disinterest-
ed directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a). An “interested person” is broadly defined. See § 80a-2(a)(19). 
The board is generally considered a “watchdog” of the industry. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 
(1979). 
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There are three major categories of funds: open-ended mutual funds, 
ETFs, and closed-end companies.67 Mutual funds are the most common type of 
fund and have the highest assets under management.68 Over 44% of American 
households are invested in mutual funds, and 65% of 401(k) plans are man-
aged by mutual funds.69 In addition to investment expertise, mutual funds offer 
diversification, daily redemption, and economies of scale.70 In function, they 
sell redeemable shares to investors and stand ready to redeem those shares at 
net asset value on a daily basis.71 The net asset value is the value of the com-
pany’s assets minus liabilities divided by the total number of shares.72 
                                                                                                                           
 66 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 651; KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1:2.1. The responsibility of 
the investment advisor is to manage and oversee the fund. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 651. 
They are specifically regulated under the Investment Advisors Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012 
& Supp. III 2015). Typically, the investment advisor will appoint one of its members to be the portfo-
lio manager. KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1:2.2. 
 67 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 644. Open-end refers to the ability of investors to “redeem” 
or exchange their shares for cash. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a) (2012) (defining an open-end). The ICA 
recognizes three greater general categories: management companies, unit investment trusts, and face-
amount certificate companies. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 644. Management companies—
which include mutual funds, ETFs, and closed-end companies—is the catch-all type for funds as they 
are any fund other than unit investment trusts and face-amount certificate companies. See id. (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(3)). Unit investment trusts issue only redeemable securities, do not maintain board 
members, and maintains a fixed portfolio. Id. Face-amount certificate companies are no longer used. 
Id. at 645. Additionally, funds are broken down into the securities types that they invest in: money 
market, fixed income, equity, and hybrid. Id. at 647. Money market funds invest in short maturity, low 
risk, unsecured debt instruments, offering smaller risk to investors. Id. at 728. Fixed income securities 
are average maturity and are those other than money market securities. Id. at 647. Equity securities are 
typically shares issued by corporations. Id. Hybrid consists of both equity and fixed income. Id. 
 68 KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1:1. The total number of U.S. mutual fund assets under management 
in 2015 was $15.7 trillion compared to ETF’s, which had a total of $2.1 trillion, and closed-end funds, 
which had a total of $261 billion. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 9. Mutual funds have enjoyed sub-
stantial growth in the past century, growing from $500 million at the time of the ICA to $15.7 trillion 
today. Id. (providing current statistics); Meyer Eisenburg & Richard M. Phillips, Mutual Fund Litiga-
tion—New Frontiers for the Investment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 73, 74 (1962) (outlining the 
growth of mutual funds from 1940 to 1960). 
 69 INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 112 (providing comprehensive statistics on mutual fund hold-
ings); see also INV. CO. INST., THE US RETIREMENT MARKET: THIRD QUARTER 2017, http://www.
ici.org/info/ret_17_q3_data.xls (providing statistics on fund holdings of retirement assets); KIRSCH, 
supra note 26, §§ 1:2.1, 1A:2.5[C]. 
 70 See KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1:2.1 (listing the benefits of mutual funds); Karmel, supra note 
61, at 914; Zhi Da et al., Informed Trading, Liquidity Provisions, and Stock Selection by Mutual Funds 
31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14609, 2008) (finding that mutual funds add 
value through expert stock selection and timing methods). Redeemable shares are those that the issuing 
company must buy back from the holder upon request. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 644. Diver-
sification occurs when an investor buys multiple different assets. HAAS, supra note 8, at 113. This can 
lead to decreased risk because risk is spread over multiple assets. See id. An economy of scale is the 
decrease in average costs that occurs when a business entity increases production. Stewart L. Brown, 
Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 329, 344 (2016). 
 71 KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1:2.1. 
 72 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 644; KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 18:1. Due to the fact that 
mutual funds must redeem the shares, mutual funds typically have greater expenses than closed-end 
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The increasingly popular ETF is considered a hybrid investment vehi-
cle.73 Unlike mutual funds, they sell shares through a public offering and the 
shares trade on a stock exchange at prices set by supply and demand.74 ETFs 
offer the ability to know what’s in the fund, risk benefits of exchange listing, 
certain tax benefits, and spread risk across different assets.75 Shares of ETFs 
                                                                                                                           
companies. KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1B:3.2. The net asset value is computed on a daily basis. INV. 
CO. INST., supra note 2, at 59. 
 73 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 11 (showing the increase in ETF assets from $16 billion in 
2000 to $2 trillion in 2015); Matt Turner, The Rise of America’s Hottest Investment Product Is Shak-
ing Up Wall Street Trading, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://markets.businessinsider.
com/news/etf/etf-trading-now-makes-up-a-huge-chunk-of-wall-street-trading-2017-1-1001656495 
[https://perma.cc/6EWW-5K2T] (finding that ETFs consisted of some of the most traded securities in 
2016). See generally STUART STRAUSS, PRACTICING LAW INST., FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMEN-
TALS: LAW, BUSINESS, COMPLIANCE, CHAPTER 17: EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS (2d ed. 2017) (cover-
ing ETFs). The increase in demand for ETFs has affected mutual funds flows. See INV. CO. INST., 
supra note 2, at 30 (noting the change in flux of asset levels). As the ETF market has increased, com-
petition within the ETF market and the new strategies deployed by funds have both increased. Chris 
Dieterich, Now There’s an ETF That Tracks the ETF Industry, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2017, 1:16 PM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/04/20/now-theres-an-etf-that-tracks-the-etf-industry/ [https://
perma.cc/4EQ4-4H8Q] (covering an ETF that follows the ETF market); Sarah Krouse, Vanguard’s 
Offer to Shareholders: Cede Power in Exchange for Lower Costs, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2017, 4:19 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguards-offer-to-shareholders-cede-power-in-exchange-for-
lower-costs-1487971140 [https://perma.cc/RC77-SJSP] (covering a new move by an asset manager to 
obtain more flexibility in selecting fund managers); Asjylyn Loder, Goldman’s $3 Billion Drop in the 
ETF Bucket, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldmans-3-billion-
drop-in-the-etf-bucket-1488483434 [https://perma.cc/TLE7-XHNJ] (highlighting the recent entrance 
of investment banks into the ETF market and that Goldman Sachs, an investment bank, maintains 
prices lower than those of ETFs already in a market controlled by Vanguard, BlackRock, and State 
Street); Imani Moise, E*Trade Becomes Latest Online Brokerage to Cut Commissions, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 2, 2017, 1:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/e-trade-becomes-latest-online-brokerage-to-
cut-commissions-1488468015 [https://perma.cc/S3YA-VZLF] (outlining the new “pricing war” be-
tween asset managers for the trading of ETFs); Nathaniel Popper, S.E.C. Rejects Winklevoss Brothers’ 
Bid to Create Bitcoin E.T.F., N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/03/10/business/dealbook/winkelvoss-brothers-bid-to-create-a-bitcoin-etf-is-rejected.
html [https://perma.cc/A4AB-WN3B] (covering a new ETF asset class that an asset manager attempt-
ed to use); Jason Zweig, How Dangerous Is a Stock Market of Mindless Robots, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-dangerous-is-a-stock-market-of-mindless-robots-148796
7352 [https://perma.cc/X5E9-Q8BQ] (covering developments in ETF and mutual fund use of elec-
tronic fund advisors). 
 74 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 645. The net asset value of an ETF is computed constantly, 
meaning the price is calculated at the time of sale. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 61. Retail investors 
may only buy and sell ETFs on exchanges while institutional investors have the option to buy and 
redeem shares in large quantities. KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1B:3:3. An initial public offering is the 
first instance that a public company offers to sell shares of its stock to the public. HAAS, supra note 8, 
at 3. 
 75 DAVID ABNER, THE ETF HANDBOOK: HOW TO VALUE AND TRADE EXCHANGE TRADED 
FUNDS 22 (2016). An ETFs is the only fund that allows an investor to know from day to day what the 
fund holds. Id. at 23. 
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are also redeemable in large blocks, called creation units, which give ETFs 
open-end company attributes.76 
Closed-end companies, the least popular types of funds, are funds that sell 
non-redeemable shares to their investors on an exchange.77 They issue a set 
number of shares in an initial public offering that are traded on a stock ex-
change.78 Closed-end companies can elect to be regulated under the ICA as a 
Business Development Company (“BDC”), which functions as a type of ven-
ture capital company.79 
3. Current Fund Use of Derivatives 
Funds see derivatives as a way to augment market exposure, hedge risks, 
increase returns through leverage, acquire lower transaction costs and positions 
otherwise unavailable, gain entry to particular markets, and manage flows 
through increased liquidity.80 Due to their potential benefits, funds have vastly 
expanded their use of derivatives since they first started using them in the 
1980s.81 
                                                                                                                           
 76 KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 34:1; STRAUSS, supra note 73, § 17.1. These creation blocks usually 
consist of 50,000 or more shares. KIRSCH supra note 26, § 35:2.2. The purchase is typically done 
through a clearing agency. Id. 
 77 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 730; KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1B:3.1. Due to the general 
illiquidity of their non-redeemable shares, closed-end companies are unpopular. KIRSCH supra note 
26, § 33:3.1. This is despite the potential lower operating costs for closed-end companies. Id. The 
shares are sold at a discount and it is argued that this is due to the increased risks of investing in 
closed-ended companies. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 733. The risks include the devaluation of 
stock if the demand for the stock decreases. Id. 
 78 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 645. 
 79 15 U.S.C. § 80a-54 (2012); id. § 80a-2(a)(48); STRAUSS, supra note 73, § 7.4. See generally 
Reginald Thomas & Paul Roye, Regulation of Business Development Companies Under the Invest-
ment Company Act, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 895, 895–96 (1982) (providing an explanation of Business 
Development Companies (“BDCs”)). A BDC must be closed-end, incorporated, and meet the re-
quirements of § 80a-2(a)(48), which prescribes that the companies principally partake in investing in 
and provide managerial assistance to small, growing businesses that the BDC issues securities of. 
STRAUSS, supra note 73, § 7.4. They are classified as non-diverse companies. Id. 
 80 See Use of Derivatives by Investment Companies Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 29776, 101 SEC Docket 3523, at 14 (proposed Aug. 31, 2011) 
[hereinafter Concept Release] (listing uses); Robert A. Robertson & Bradley W. Paulson, A Method-
ology for Mutual Fund Derivative Investments, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 237, 238 (1995) (listing 
uses); Eric D. Roiter, Investment Companies’ Use of OTC Derivatives: Does the Existing Regulatory 
Regime Work?, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 271, 273 (1995) (listing uses of OTC derivatives). 
 81 See COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SEC., supra note 12, at 12 (suggesting that funds have 
been using derivatives since the 1980s); DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 (finding that funds that typi-
cally use derivatives with greater frequency grew the most out of all other funds between 2010 and 
2014); KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:1 (positing that the use of derivatives has dramatically increased 
in the past two decades); Kibbie, supra note 4, at 209–10 (highlighting the increased use). 
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The most common use of derivatives by funds is to further the fund’s in-
vestment goals by hedging investments from risks.82 Mutual funds will use 
credit derivatives, currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives and equity de-
rivatives to hedge against certain investment-specific risks.83 
Funds also use derivatives for their leverage characteristics.84 Alternative 
strategy funds, mutual funds that hold non-traditional investments, make use of 
leverage through extensive derivatives in their portfolios in a way similar to 
hedge funds.85 Some funds use what is called a 130/30 leverage strategy.86 The 
increasingly popular geared or leveraged ETFs, double or triple returns of dai-
ly indexes through derivatives leverage.87 Synthetic ETFs, funds that are creat-
ed to mimic the value of an index, commonly use swaps.88 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SEC., supra note 12, at 6 (covering hedging); Tian, supra 
note 12, at 1 (same). Risk management and sharing is considered the “primary purpose” of derivative 
use by mutual funds. Tian, supra note 12, at 1. Derivatives allow funds to shift risk to those who wish 
to bear it. Id. It is considered an important function of the market to maintain efficient risk allocation. 
Id. 
 83 ROY GIRASA, SHADOW BANKING: THE RISE, RISKS, AND REWARDS OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 218 (2016); KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.2; Letter and Memorandum from Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, SEC, to Edward J. Markey, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Subcomm. on Tele-
comms. & Fin. and Jack Fields, Ranking Republican Member, U.S. House of Representatives Sub-
comm. on Telecomms. & Fin. 2 (Sept 26, 1994) [hereinafter Levitt Letter & Memorandum] (on file 
with SEC). Currency derivatives hedge against changes in currency rates. Concept Release, supra note 
80, at 14. For example, a fund may hedge against the rise in the value of foreign currency by taking a 
short forward in the currency. Id. at 15. Interest rate derivatives can be used to hedge against changes 
in interest rates. Id. This can be accomplished through the use of interest rate swaps. Id. at 16. Equity 
derivatives allow funds to achieve liquidity or “equitize” cash using long futures. Id. Credit deriva-
tives can hedge against credit default or other events that an investment may be based upon. Id. 
Though a fund may use these derivatives to hedge, each can also be used to expose the fund to possi-
ble gains. Id. at 14–17. 
 84 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 12; COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SEC., supra note 12, 
at 8; KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:3.1. 
 85 DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2; INV. CO. INST., supra note 13, at 42. Alternative strategy funds 
often use hedge fund strategies of hedging risk with derivatives. Drew Singer, X. SEC Regulation of 
Mutual Funds’ Illiquid Assets, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 491, 498 (2015); Mallory Horejs, Inter-
preting Morningstar’s Alternative Categories: A Category Guide to Navigating the Increasingly 
Complex World of Alternative Investing, MORNINGSTAR ALTERNATIVE INV. OBSERVER, Second 
Quarter, 2011, at 2. 




E2J2] (describing the strategy); Shefali Anand, Leverage Shakes Up Mutual Funds, Which Discover a 
Strategy’s Downside, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123276245590
712349 [https://perma.cc/P8AN-2WUQ]. The 130/30 strategy entails using a great deal of leverage, 
shorting 30% of held securities. Anand, supra, at 2. 
 87 See Tim Dulany, et al., Leverage, Inverse, and Futures-Based ETFs, 19 No. 1 PIABA B.J. 83, 
84–85 (2012) (explaining leveraged ETFs); Lewis Braham, Leveraged ETFs Raise the Ante, BAR-
RON’S (Apr. 8, 2017), http://www.barrons.com/articles/leveraged-etfs-raise-the-ante-1491627055 
[https://perma.cc/M26V-QEZK] (covering new leveraged ETFs that are four times leveraged); Crystal 
Kim, Triple Leveraged Crude Oil ETFs: Speculation Cubed?, BARRON’S (Mar. 28, 2017), http://
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The leverage characteristics of derivatives had unintended effects on 
some mutual fund portfolios in the 2008 Financial Crisis.89 For example, Op-
penheimer Champion Income Fund sustained an 80% loss and Oppenheimer 
Core Bond Fund sustained a 30% loss.90 More recently, Catalyst Hedged Fu-
tures Strategy Fund, a mutual fund, sustained a loss of $600 million over a 
five-day period by trading options.91 
                                                                                                                           
www.barrons.com/articles/triple-leveraged-crude-oil-etfs-speculation-cubed-1490722447 [https://
perma.cc/HS7D-P6AN] (covering a the launch of a new triple-leveraged crude oil ETF); Adam Zoll, 
How Some Funds Give More Than 100% When It Comes to Asset Allocation, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 
23, 2015), http://cawidgets.morningstar.ca/ArticleTemplate/ArticleGL.aspx?culture=en-CA&id=
689628 [https://perma.cc/S4VX-6C7Q] (explaining how leveraged ETFs use leverage to gain greater 
exposure). There are also inverse ETFs that seek to return the inverse of the index it is tracking. See 
Leveraged and Inverse ETFs: Specialized Products with Extra Risks for Buy-and-Hold Investors, 
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/leveragedetfs-alert.htm [https://perma.cc/UB3J-2TAS] (cov-
ering leveraged and inverse ETFs). See generally Thomas Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: 
A Commentary on the Effects of Options, Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 789, 789 (1987) (providing an overview of index derivatives). These inverse and lev-
eraged ETFs use swaps and futures to meet their goals. See Morley, supra note 62, at 375; Leveraged 
and Inverse ETFs, supra. Funds like funds of Hedge Funds invest in private investment pools for 
sophisticated investors that may use derivatives. See Funds of Hedge Funds—Higher Costs and Risks 
for Higher Potential Returns, Fin. Industry Reg. Authority, http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/
funds-hedge-funds-higher-costs-and-risks-higher-potential-returns [https://perma.cc/38K5-J84R] 
(covering funds of funds). 
 88 See Awrey, supra note 3, at 271–73 (covering synthetic ETFs). These funds use what are called 
total return swaps, swapping cash flows of floating interest rate with a total return on an asset or port-
folio. See Srichander Ramaswamy, Market Structures and Systemic Risks of Exchange-Traded Funds 
4-6 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 343, 2011) (covering total return swaps). 
 89 See OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 9, at 18 (covering mutual fund use of derivatives in the 
Financial Crisis); Adam & Guettler, supra note 7, at 1 (same). 
 90 See OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 9, at 18; Adam & Guettler, supra note 7, at 1. Several 
mutual funds also saw great losses in the 1990s due to derivative use. See Jerry W. Markham, Protect-
ing the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 361 (1995) 
(covering mutual fund losses in the 1990s); see also In re UBS Willow Mgmt. L.L.C., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 31869, 2015 WL 6123024 (Oct. 16, 2015) (settled action) (involving a 
fund that was forced to liquidate after derivative use led to immense losses); In re Claymore Advisors, 
LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 30308, 2012 WL 6608205 (Dec. 19, 2012) (describing a 
fund that lost 45% of its assets due and eventual liquidation due to derivative use). A 2015 study 
found that is it “theoretically possibly,” given the wide parameters allowed by current regulations that 
funds could default “solely” based upon their derivative use. Dominika Paula Galkiewicz, Regulation, 
Leverage, and Derivative Use by Mutual Funds 42 (Mar. 23, 2015) (unpublished dissertation, Hum-
bolt University of Berlin) (on file with Humbolt University of Berlin). 
 91 Chris Dieterich & Gunjan Banerji, Fund’s $600 Million Lost Week Captivates Traders, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 16, 2017, 7:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/funds-600-million-lost-week-captivates-
traders-1487292045 [https://perma.cc/VD62-Q6KQ]; Matt Levine, Volatility Trades and Explosive 
Shorts, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Feb. 17, 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/
2017-02-17/volatility-trades-and-explosive-shorts [https://perma.cc/4DEH-2AFQ]. The VIX or the 
CBOE volatility index, sometimes called the “fear index” measures market volatility for options mar-
kets and will typically go up as the S&P 500 goes down. Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, 
and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 768 (2009). The VIX increased substantially 
despite an increase in equity markets. Dieterich & Banerji, supra note, at 1. 
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B. Current SEC Regulation of Fund Use of Derivatives 
The ICA specifically governs fund capital structure but makes no mention 
of derivatives.92 During the 1920s and 1930s, the SEC found that funds ex-
ploited unsophisticated investors and lacked sufficient assets to cover their 
heavy use of leverage.93 Accordingly, the ICA was passed in 1940 and the SEC 
was charged with enforcing the provisions that serve to protect investors from 
the harmful consequences of leverage.94 
Section 18 of the ICA addresses leverage by prohibiting funds from issu-
ing a senior security or selling a security of which it is the issuer unless the 
fund has sufficient asset coverage.95 Senior securities are defined in the ICA as 
obligations or instruments that are a security that signal indebtedness or stock 
that has priority over classes that distribute assets or pay dividends and thus 
increase a fund’s leverage.96 
Derivatives were later recognized in the General Statement of Policy in 
the Investment Company Act Release 10666 (“Release 10666”) and in an as-
sortment of no-action letters as falling under the functional definition of senior 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2012) (regulating fund capital structure); The Investment 
Company Act of 1940, supra note 61, at 449–51 (explaining § 18 of the ICA). Under the ICA, an in-
vestment company is a securities issuer who holds itself out as being “primarily engaged in the busi-
ness of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.” See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (defining “in-
vestment company” under the ICA); see also supra notes 60–79 (providing a more in-depth explana-
tion of an investment company under the ICA). Funds are subject to numerous statutory requirements 
under the ICA. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 655 (listing the regulations funds are subject 
to). Capital structure is the distribution of debt and equity that a company chooses to have. 1 COX & 
HAZEN, supra note 65, § 18.1. 
 93 See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of 
the Sen. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong. 265–78 (1940) (finding abuses by funds); see 
also Levitt Letter & Memorandum, supra note 83, at 21 (describing the practices in the 1920s and 
1930s that gave rise to § 18’s limitations on leverage, and specifically discussing the potential abuse 
of senior security holders). Shareholder losses in the 1930s were found to be over $1 billion. Knickle, 
supra note 60, at 781. 
 94 See KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 3:3.1[A] (covering the context of the ICA’s enactment); The 
Investment Company Act of 1940, supra note 61, at 440 (same). The SEC was given power to make, 
issue, amend, and rescind rules and regulations to enforce the ICA. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-38 (listing the 
powers granted the SEC). 
 95 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18; Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25, 129. There are different require-
ments for open-end and closed-end companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a) (addressing closed-end); id. 
§ 80a-18f(a) (addressing open-end). Open-end companies cannot issue any senior security but may bor-
row from a bank if it has 300% asset coverage. Id. § 80a-18(f)(1). Closed-end companies, however, can 
issue three securities classes. Id. § 80a-18(a). This essentially limits funds to borrowing from a bank. 
KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1B:3.2[C]. Congress was concerned with abuse of senior security purchasers, 
the increase in undue speculation of junior securities caused by senior securities, and inadequate covering 
reserves. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(7)–(8) (listing the purposes of the ICA). 
 96 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(g) (defining “senior security”). This would include bonds, debentures, 
and other instruments that enjoy priority rights, such as preferred stock. See id. 
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securities because of their potential for leverage.97 Despite this characteriza-
tion, funds may still avoid the senior security treatment in their use of deriva-
tives, so long as they establish a segregated account and cover the securities 
with offsetting positions.98 
The segregated account requirement prescribes that liquid assets be main-
tained and frozen in a separate account.99 The liquid assets that “cover” within 
the segregated account must completely amount to and increase with the total 
notional amount of the obligation of the derivatives.100 A fund may also cover 
its obligations through ownership or holding the right to obtain the instrument 
that it has been obligated to deliver.101 
The notional amount of a derivative is the number of assets that are stated 
in the derivatives contract multiplied by the value of the asset.102 If the amount 
of the contract is known at the beginning of the transaction, notional amount 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Dreyfus Strategic Investing and Dreyfus Strategic Income, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,472 (June 22, 1987) [hereinafter Dreyfus No-Action 
Letter] (recognizing derivatives); Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128 (recognizing the dangers of 
instruments that involve leverage); KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 8A:1 (covering Release 10666); Kibbie, 
supra note 4, at 232 (same). No-action letters are SEC replies to requests for guidance on whether a 
certain action meets the requirements of current law. HAZEN, supra note 4, § 1:4[4]. Though influen-
tial and insightful, no-action letters are not binding. Id. The SEC issues staff no-action letters when 
posed with the question of whether the federal securities laws apply with respect to certain transac-
tions. Concept Release, supra note 80, at 23 n.68. As such, they are not binding as to how the Com-
mission would actually address a given situation. TAMAR FRANKEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
REGULATION 32 (4th ed., 2011). Release 10666 did not expressly address derivatives, but rather finan-
cial commitment transactions. See Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128 (failing to directly mention 
derivatives). “Financial commitment transaction” is a new term defined by the SEC Proposing Release. 
Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 58–59. The SEC generally characterizes these transactions as those 
that have a conditional or unconditional obligation to pay or deliver assets. Id. It includes “reverse repur-
chase agreements, short sales, firm standby commitment agreements or similar agreement.” Id. Reverse 
repurchase agreements are short-term investment tools where a buyer agrees to buy a certain financial 
instrument and the seller agrees to buy back the asset. Michael Spielman, Whole Loan Repurchase 
Agreements: An Assessment of Investment Transaction Risks in Light of Continuing Legal Uncertainty, 
99 COM. L.J. 476, 476–77 (1994). Short sales are the sales of securities whereby the seller does not have 
ownership of the security. Perrie M. Weiner & Edward D. Totino, New SEC Rules Change Regulation of 
Short Sales, 10 NO. 13 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 16, 16 n.1 (2004). Firm standby commitment 
agreements are rights to sell an underlying security within a certain period at a price of the security plus 
interest. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a41-1 (2017). 
 98 Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25, 134; Dreyfus No-Action Letter, supra note 97, at 2. 
 99 Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,132. Liquid assets are defined as “cash, U.S. government 
securities, or other appropriate high-grade debt obligations.” Id. 
 100 Id. The No-Action Letter to Merrill Lynch Asset Management greatly broadened the scope of 
liquid assets that could cover obligations by adding that any liquid asset could cover obligations. Kibbie, 
supra note 4, at 235. Due to the change, portfolio securities could be used to cover derivative posi-
tions. COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SEC., supra note 12, at 14. 
 101 Concept Release, supra note 80, at 24. The Dreyfus No-Action Letter added this option. Drey-
fus No-Action Letter supra note 97, at 3. 
 102 Feder, supra note 41, at 683. The mark to market approach is used in valuing the notional 
amount. Concept Release, supra note 80, at 22 n.65. 
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segregation is used to calculate the amount.103 If the transaction does not in-
volve a physical settlement, funds will use the mark-to-market approach.104 
The segregated account requirement can also be met by making a designation 
in the fund’s books.105 
II. PROPOSED RULE 18F-4 
In 2011, over thirty years after issuing Release 10666, the SEC produced 
a Concept Release requesting comments on whether the existing law on the 
use of derivatives by funds was sufficient.106 After considering the comments 
received and making the determination that updated and complete regulations 
were needed, the SEC conceived Proposed Rule 18f-4.107 The exemptive rule 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Concept Release, supra note 80, at 9. The notional amount is the full amount of the underlying 
asset. Id. 
 104 Id. at 26–27. Mark-to-market accounting values assets at the fair market value, or the current 
market price, of the underlying asset rather than the price paid. Michelle Clark Neely, Making Sense 
of Mark to Market, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS, https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-
economist/january-1994/making-sense-of-mark-to-market [https://perma.cc/4HBU-GXHN]. The daily 
gains or losses are calculated and then funds must be added or subtracted to compensate. See CFTC 
Glossary: Mark-to-Market, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURE TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/
consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/glossary_m [https://perma.cc/8LAD-9G2A] (cover-
ing mark-to-mark accounting). Some have argued that mark-to-market accounting led to the Financial 
Crisis. See Nicole Gelinas, Mark to Market: A False Culprit, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 145, 145 (2010) 
(rebutting the argument that mark to market caused the Financial Crisis); Elizabeth Williamson & 
Kara Scannell, Momentum Gathers to Ease Mark-to-Market Accounting Rule, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 
2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122290736164696507 [https://perma.cc/4V6F-
VYKP] (outlining the push to suspend mark to market accounting). For example, if a fund entered into 
a futures contract to purchase 100 shares of Stock A at $100 per share, the fund would need to place 
$10,000 (100 shares multiplied by the notional amount of the share ($100)) in a segregated account that it 
could not remove until performance of the contract. See Dreyfus No-Action Letter supra note 97, at 2; 
Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,132. 
 105 Concept Release, supra note 80, at 26. 
 106 Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128 (released in 1979); Concept Release, supra note 80, at 
1. Comments are a right that the public has to address issues posed by the SEC. ALFRED AMAN & 
WILLIAM MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (2014). A Concept Release is a precursor to a pro-
posed rule that the SEC publishes to identify an area of concern and solicit questions from the public. 
J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 5:2, Westlaw (database 
updated Apr. 2017). The SEC received comments addressing the qualifying liquid covering assets, 
mark-to-market approach, and the cash settlement of swaps. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 41 
n.113. 
 107 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 8. Proposed Rule 18f-4 was voted upon in December of 
2015. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes New Derivatives Rules for Registered Funds and Business 
Development Companies (Dec. 11, 2015) (on file with SEC). The Commission’s vote was 3–1 in favor 
of the rule. SEC Proposes New Exemptive Rule to Regulate Funds’ Use of Derivatives, DECHERT LLP 
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/onpoint/2015/12/sec-proposes-new-exemptive-
rule-to-regulate-funds-use-of-derivat.html [https://perma.cc/5H9H-ZZ74]. Commissioner Michael 
Piwowar dissented. See Piwowar Statement, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining his reasons for dissent-
ing). Comments closed on March 16, 2016. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 2. Administrative law 
requires that agencies provide an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed rules after notice 
has been given. 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRAC-
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is intended to provide a more extensive regulatory framework for derivatives 
use by registered funds in light of the expansion of derivatives use in the past 
few decades.108 In furthering that objective, Proposed Rule 18f-4 prescribes 
limits on derivative leverage, requires the holding of sufficient assets to cover 
derivative obligations, and mandates the establishment of an official risk man-
agement program before a fund can enter into derivatives transactions.109 Sec-
tion A of this Part explores the purposes of the rule and the specific circum-
stances the SEC believed necessitated Proposed Rule 18f-4.110 Section B out-
lines the portfolio limitations that Proposed Rule 18f-4 would prescribe.111 
Section C outlines the asset segregation requirements for derivative transac-
tions and the additional provisions of the proposed rule, including the deriva-
tives risk management program, recordkeeping requirements, and proposed 
amendments to Form N-PORT and Form N-CEN.112 
A. Background and Purpose of Proposed Rule 18f-4 
Substantial increases in the volume and complexity of derivatives led the 
SEC to conclude that investors were exposed to increasing portfolio risks be-
cause of derivative use.113 In order to further § 18 of the ICA’s goal of protect-
ing investors, the SEC moved to modernize and broaden the regulation of fund 
use of derivatives through Proposed Rule 18f-4.114 Two interconnected deter-
                                                                                                                           
TICE § 4:33, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018). Mary Jo White stated in a letter in December of 
2016 that Proposed Rule 18f-4 was ready for SEC consideration. Letter from Mary Jo White, Chair, 
SEC, to Sherrod Brown, Chair, Senate Comm. on Banking and Mark Warner, Chair, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs, Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. (Dec. 12, 2016) (on file with SEC). 
 108 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 8 (finding that current regulations insufficiently addressed 
the current market uses of derivatives). Derivatives are considered senior securities under the ICA and 
therefore cannot be used by funds unless they adhere to the exemptions. Id. at 9. Proposed Rule 18f-4 
lays out what exactly a fund must do before it can use derivatives. See id. 
 109 Id. at 9. If adopted, it would supplant Release 10666 and the numerous no-action letters that 
cover derivatives and financial commitment transactions and fall within § 18 of the ICA. Id. at 54. 
 110 See infra notes 113–125 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 126–158 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 159–182 and accompanying text. 
 113 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 9. In the 2011 Concept Release, the SEC concluded that 
derivative use had grown enough to warrant further review. Concept Release, supra note 80, at 6. No-
action letters intervening for the period between the 1994 Report and the Concept Release relaxed 
some of the standards set out in Release 10666. See Merrill Lynch Asset Management, L.P., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1996 WL 429027, at *5 (July 2, 1996) (expanding the adequate liquid assets that could 
cover obligations); Letter from Lawrence A. Friend, Chief Accountant, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., to Chief 
Fin. Officers (Nov. 7, 1997) (on file with SEC) (permitting easier provisions to set up segregated 
account). 
 114 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 9. The ICA was enacted to protect the public and investors 
from harmful fund practices. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2012). The SEC has calculated the economic effect 
of Proposed Rule 18f-4 to be an overall net increase in investor protection. Proposing Release, supra 
note 4, at 275. A full quantification of the effects is limited due to the lack of information available. 
Id. at 274. From its calculations, the SEC believes that the rule will result in an increased likelihood of 
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minants drove the SEC to take a new approach: (1) changes in derivative use 
that occurred after Release 10666 and (2) current derivative uses that implicate 
§ 18 of the ICA.115 
According to the SEC, existing regulations did not contemplate the cur-
rent market or sufficiently mitigate the risks involved with the use of deriva-
tives.116 Specifically, Release 10666 was found to insufficiently address new 
fund practices because the total amount of leverage that a fund could obtain 
under Release 10666’s segregated account approach was much greater than 
initially envisioned.117 The mark-to-market approach for cash settled deriva-
tives allowed under Release 10666 had been expanded to a broader set of cash 
settled derivatives, sometimes for any cash settled derivative.118 This allowed 
for greater exposure because a mark-to-market approach permits a fund to only 
cover losses during each day.119 In addition, funds could use “any” liquid as-
sets to cover the obligations, allowing funds to use less liquid and higher risk 
                                                                                                                           
investments that could then lead to an increase in capital for funds. Id. at 276. The SEC concluded that 
an increase in investor protection could, in turn, lead to an increase in confidence amongst investors who 
will then be more likely to invest in these kinds of financial instruments. Id. By providing more solidified 
regulation than the no-action letter and interpretive guidance that currently controls, the proposed rule 
could also reduce costs. Id. at 277. Funds would, however, bear one-time costs and ongoing costs in 
meeting the requirements of the rule. Id. at 319. The extent of the costs was hypothesized to differ 
depending on an individual fund’s use of derivatives as well as differing investment strategies, portfo-
lio compositions, market reactions, and incentives to move out of the § 18 limitations. Id. Transactions 
costs could result if funds shift away from derivatives to other instruments or assets. Id. 
 115 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 14–30. Release 10666 echoed the leverage and asset cov-
erage concerns of § 18 of the ICA. Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128. Section 18 of the ICA 
governs the capital structure of a fund. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18. The SEC’s conclusions rely heavily on the 
DERA White Paper on the Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies (“DERA White 
Paper”), a study done on a random sample of 10% of funds. See Proposing Release, supra note 4 (citing 
DERA White Paper over forty-five times); see also DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 1 (explaining the 
general concepts of the study). Morningstar and semiannual reporting documents aided the random 
sampling. DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–2. The DERA White Paper uses Morningstar’s nine catego-
ries of funds. Id. at 1 n.2. Alternate strategy funds, as used in the Proposing Release, include Morn-
ingstar’s alternative, nontraditional bond, and commodity funds categories. Proposing Release, supra 
note 4, at 109 n.87. 
 116 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 22, 34 (finding that certain fund practices allow for funds 
to circumvent regulations). 
 117 Id. at 22, 37; see also supra note 91–105 and accompanying text (explaining the segregated 
account approach). The SEC presented two chief concerns in Release 10666: (1) the ability of funds to 
obtain leverage; and (2) the ability of funds to meet their obligations. Proposing Release, supra note 4, 
at 33. Under the mark-to-market approach, a fund might not have to segregate any of its assets. Id. at 
37. For example, the SEC found that some funds had obtained notional exposures ten times of net 
assets. See id. at 38. 
 118 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 21. 
 119 Id. For example, if a fund that was involved in cash-settled futures took the long position, the 
fund would only need to segregate assets to cover the obligation if, by the end of the trading day, the 
obligation would have a loss instead of segregating the total obligation. See id. Some funds use the 
approach for all cash settled derivatives. See id. Cash settlement occurs when settling a futures con-
tract where cash is provided rather than the physical asset. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 857. 
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assets than what was initially required under Release 10666.120 The SEC con-
cluded that, through the use of both mark-to-market and the nature of the cov-
ering assets, funds could segregate a significantly smaller and insufficient 
amount of assets to cover obligations and therefore could be unable to perform 
their obligations.121 
The SEC also found that the current use of derivatives by funds implicat-
ed the senior security concerns in § 18 of the ICA raised by undue speculation 
and insufficient assets to cover obligations.122 Funds’ derivatives use caused 
undue speculation concerns addressed in § 1(b)(7) of the ICA through exten-
sive derivatives leveraging.123 Through their leveraging, funds achieved no-
tional investment exposure that far exceeded their net asset values, with some 
funds maintaining alarming exposures as high as 900% of their assets.124 Addi-
tionally, the SEC found that derivative use by some funds implicated the insuf-
ficient assets concerns in § 1(b)(8) of the ICA.125 Due to the leverage inherent 
in some derivatives, a transaction could cause losses that surpass delivered col-
lateral or margin.126 Consequently, fund advisors may have to sell fund in-
                                                                                                                           
 120 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 36. This approach was allowed by the Merrill Lynch No-
Action Letter that expanded liquid assets to mean any liquid asset to cover obligations in segregated 
accounts. Id. at 36 n.99. For example, a fund can now use equity securities and lower grade debt secu-
rities that it maintains in its portfolio to cover its obligations. Id. at 21. By using less liquid, meaning 
more difficult to convert to cash, assets to cover, a fund may not be able to fulfill an obligation when 
it comes due. Id. 
 121 Id. at 35. For example, a fund could enter into a derivatives transaction and use its portfolio 
equity to cover its obligation, instead of using more liquid assets like cash, and would only need to 
segregate assets to cover a daily loss. Id. The mark-to-market approach does not take into considera-
tion the future losses. Id. The approach only accounts for losses that have already been sustained. Id. 
The SEC found that some funds had obtained notional exposures that were greatly in excess of net 
assets and had the potential to increase exposures. See id. at 38. Exposure is the greatest amount of 
loss due to a counterparty default. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 863. 
 122 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 25. 
 123 Id. at 25–26. In addressing derivative use risks, leverage is a chief concern of the SEC. Id. at 12. 
The SEC quoted the definition of leverage from Release 10666: “leverage exists when an investor 
achieves the right to a return on a capital base that exceeds the investment which he as personally 
contributed to the entity or instrument achieving a return.” Id. Leverage magnifies changes in the 
value of the underlying asset. See Ang et al., supra note 49, at 38 (defining characteristics of lever-
age). 
 124 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 27, 102. The notional investment exposure is the number 
of assets that are stated in the derivatives contract multiplied by the value of the asset. Feder, supra note 
41, at 683. Net asset values are calculated by subtracting the fund’s total liabilities from total assets. 
Fast Answers: Net Asset Value, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/answers/nav.htm [https://perma.cc/A34J-
U4AV]. 
 125 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(8) (2012); Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 28. Companies that oper-
ate without adequate assets are deemed to be adversely affecting the national public interest. 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(8). 
 126 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 28. 
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vestments that could lead to investor losses and the possible insolvency of the 
fund.127 
B. Portfolio Limitations for Derivatives Transactions 
With the intent of addressing § 1(b)(7)’s undue speculation and leverage 
concerns triggered by current fund practices, Proposed Rule 18f-4 requires 
adherence to one of two portfolio limitations before a fund can enter into a de-
rivative transaction.128 A fund must meet either an exposure-based or a risk-
based portfolio limit.129 
1. Exposure-Based Portfolio Limitation 
The exposure-based portfolio limit constrains a fund’s leverage gained 
through senior securities by limiting the fund’s total exposure, or the total risk 
of loss from derivatives transactions.130 Under this portfolio limit, the maxi-
mum amount of total calculated exposure cannot surpass 150% of the fund’s 
net assets.131 In balancing the benefits and risks of derivatives use, the SEC 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Id. at 29. Liquid assets would need to be produced from the fund’s investments in the event of 
a derivative transaction that results in a loss magnified by leverage. Id. The margin is a cash amount 
required as a deposit for an option or future trade. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 867; see also supra 
note 49 and accompanying text (explaining margin account). 
 128 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 64–65. The limitations also have a secondary aim of en-
suring that funds can adequately meet their obligations to counterparties in order to prevent the liqui-
dation of fund assets. Id. at 65 n.152. 
 129 Id. at 64. Mandated by section 4(a)(5)(i) of the Proposed Rule, the fund’s board of directors 
and a majority of uninterested directors would need to approve of the portfolio limitation that the fund 
will use. Id. at 411. The fund’s board of directors is the overseer for the fund’s dealings and the in-
vestment advisor. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 651. A fund would only need to comply with the 
limitation after it entered into a senior security transaction. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 150. If 
the transaction resulted in an increase in exposure that was greater than the limits, the fund does not have 
to terminate the transaction, but the fund could not enter into another transaction until it complied with 
the limit. Id. at 150–51. 
 130 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 66. Exposure is generally defined in section 4(c)(3)(i)-(iii) 
of the Proposed Rule as the sum of the fund’s aggregate notional amount of senior securities transac-
tions. Id. at 414, 418 (defining “senior securities transaction” as including derivatives, financial com-
mitment transaction, and any other senior security transaction entered into pursuant to § 18 or § 61 of 
the ICA). Senior securities are defined in the Proposing Rule and the ICA as obligations or instruments 
that are both a security and signal indebtedness and stock that has priority over classes that distribute 
assets or pay dividends. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 414; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(g) (de-
fining “senior security”). 
 131 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 66. In deciding on the 150% limit, the SEC considered 
numerous factors. Id. at 92. The SEC considered lower percentages (50% and 100%) but concluded 
that those thresholds could prevent beneficial uses of derivatives. Id. at 93–94. Higher levels were 
viewed by the SEC as possibly promoting speculative use. Id. at 95. The SEC made the conclusion 
that fund strategies would not be greatly impacted due to their finding that most funds use derivatives 
with small notional amounts. Id. at 95–96. Lastly, the SEC made the determination that, although the 
150% limit would not alone prevent all losses driven by derivatives, other provisions of Proposed 
Rule 18f-4 would sufficiently aid in mitigation. Id. at 96. 
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hopes that the overall limit will provide sufficient flexibility for funds to con-
tinue to use derivatives but to limit the risks involved.132 Exposure is calculat-
ed as the total of: (1) the total adjusted notional amounts of derivatives transac-
tions; (2) the total obligations under financial commitment transactions; and 
(3) the total indebtedness caused by other senior securities transactions pursu-
ant to § 18 or § 61 of the ICA.133 
The first part of the exposure calculation, the total notional amount of de-
rivatives transactions, measures the fund’s exposure to the underlying asset.134 
Notional amount is generally defined in Proposed Rule 18f-4 as the “market 
value of the underlying reference asset or the principal amount on which pay-
ment obligations under the derivatives transaction are calculated.”135 This defi-
nition was adopted to measure fund exposure while capturing the wide variety 
of derivative uses.136 
Three types of special derivatives transactions would be subject to an ad-
justed notional amount calculation.137 For the first type of derivatives transac-
tions, those that yield returns contingent upon leveraged performance of an 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. at 71–72. 
 133 Id. at 66; see infra note 135 and accompanying text (setting forth the Proposed Rule’s defini-
tion of notional amount). 
 134 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 67. 
 135 Id. at 415–16. It is “notional” because there has been no payment or receipt of the asset. See 
HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 868 (explaining why the term “notional” is used with derivatives). The 
principal is the face value of the instrument. Id. at 870. The payment obligation that the definition 
refers to is the margin requirements of some derivatives transactions. Id. at 867. The margin is a cash 
amount required as a deposit for an option or future trade. Id.; see also supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text (explaining margin account). 
 136 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 67. It was also generally consistent with both the use of 
notional amount in other agencies’ regulations and the private market’s calculation of exposure in the 
market. Id. at 67–68. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) also uses notional 
amount to measure exposure. Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants, 79 Fed. Reg. 59,898 (proposed Oct. 3, 2014). The CFTC has jurisdiction over 
derivatives exchanges. Brunet & Shafe, supra note 6, at 668. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
Group Inc., International Swaps and Derivatives Association, and the Bank for International Settle-
ments, all financial institutions that facilitate derivatives trading, use a similar definition. See Glossa-
ry: Notional Value, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/education/glossary.html [https://perma.
cc/UAM8-MKEM]; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
STATISTICS 31 (July 2009) (hereinafter BIS Guide), http://www.bis.org/statistics/intfinstatsguide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G5XX-RWLM] (same). The SEC concedes, however, that the definition does have 
limitations but the difficulty in shaping future fund tactics and uses of derivatives make notional amount 
a more attractive choice compared to other definitions. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 70–71. 
Measurements of leverage can discount notional amount. Id. at 70–71. Additionally, some measure-
ments have more precise calculations of hedging. Id. at 70–71. The definition does not precisely differ-
entiate the different risks involved with different derivative uses. Id. at 70. Two derivative transactions 
could have the same notional amount but have vastly differing risks. Id. The SEC made the determina-
tion that notional amount was the most effective and administrable definition and addressed the issue 
that leverage can be calculated in more precise ways. Id. at 70–71. 
 137 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 72. In these cases, the SEC found that the standard notion-
al amount calculation would not adequately measure exposure. Id. 
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underlying asset, the notional amount is multiplied by the leverage factor to 
calculate the adjusted notional amount.138 For the second type of transaction, 
those where the underlying asset is an investment managed account/entity or 
an index of a managed account/entity, the fund must do what is referred to as a 
“look-through.139 Such a process references the fund’s “pro-rata share” of the 
notional amounts of the derivatives transactions of such account/entity to de-
termine the adjusted notional amount.140 The third and last type of transaction 
addressed, those involving complex transactions, have notional amounts that 
are difficult to calculate.141 For any complex derivatives transaction, the no-
tional amount would be equal to another non-complex derivatives transaction, 
called a substituted instrument, which would have the same market risk.142 
The final two parts of the exposure calculation is the addition of the total 
amount of exposure created by financial commitment transactions and other se-
curities.143 The amount of exposure that is added is the total of the amount of 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See id. For example, a total return swap with a notional value of $100 that provides a return 
that is three times the index would have a notional amount of $300 under the Proposed Rule. Id. 
Without this added calculation, a fund could avoid limitation requirements. Id. at 72–73. The SEC 
believes that if such additional requirements were not in place, funds could structure around exposure 
limitations. Id. at 73. The leverage factor, sometimes called the leverage ratio, is determined by the 
ratio of the debt to equity. See id. The leverage factor is calculated by multiplying the delta by the 
underlying price and dividing the sum by the derivative price per underlying unit. Derivatives: Lever-
age Factor, INV. & FIN., http://www.investment-and-finance.net/derivatives/l/leverage-factor.html 
[https://perma.cc/QLZ4-643U]. The delta is the “rate of price change of the derivative contract with 
the price of the underlying asset,” or, in other words, the number of units held to completely hedge all 
risk. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 860. 
 139 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 73. 
 140 Id. These transactions are deemed to be equal to a direct investment in the derivatives traded 
by the managed account or entity. Id. at 73–74. Thus, a fund could get around exposure limitations. Id. 
at 74. This type of calculation would apply to the swaps on pooled investment vehicles that are pri-
marily investing in derivatives transactions such as leveraged ETFs, hedge funds, and managed fu-
tures funds. Id. If there was no “look-through” calculation, a fund could get around the portfolio limi-
tations by investing in funds that are highly engaged in derivatives transactions and would not have to 
invest in derivatives itself. Id. at 73–74. 
 141 Id. at 74. A complex derivatives transaction is defined by section 4(c)(1) of the Proposed Rule 
as any derivative transaction for which the amount payable by either party upon settlement date, ma-
turity or exercise: “(1) is dependent on the value of the underlying reference asset at multiple points in 
time during the term of the transaction; or (2) is a non-linear function of the value of the underlying 
reference asset, other than due to optionality arising from a single strike price.” Id. at 414. Linear 
function refers to payouts changing on dollar for dollar basis as the value of the underlying asset 
changes. Id. at 76. Examples of the first category would include path dependent options, American 
lookback options, barrier options, and Asian options, the payoff of each depending on the price of the 
underlying asset in addition to the spot price. See id. at 76 n.177; HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 668 
(explaining path dependent options). Examples of the second category include variance swaps, where 
the payoffs are based on variance. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 76. 
 142 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 79. Barrier options, which can sometimes be hedged by 
standard options (a non-complex derivative), could be calculated to have an aggregate notional 
amount the same as an option that would hedge a barrier option. Id. at 79–80. 
 143 Id. at 82. Financial commitment transactions and other senior securities bear resemblance to 
derivatives in that they evidence indebtedness. Id. These types of investments include bank borrow-
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cash or other assets that the fund is conditionally or unconditionally obligated to 
pay or deliver under any financial commitment transactions and the total debt 
created by any other senior securities transactions that the fund enters into.144 
In computing the sum aggregate notional exposure of a derivative transac-
tion, a fund may net offsetting derivatives transactions.145 Reference asset, ma-
turity, and other material terms must, however, be the same in both transac-
tions.146 The exposure-based portfolio limitation, however, does not permit a 
fund to calculate hedging or cover transactions in the total notional amount.147 
2. Risk-Based Portfolio Limitation 
A fund can instead choose to adopt the risk-based portfolio limit approach 
and, by doing so, maintain greater exposure levels than the exposure-based 
portfolio limit permits.148 In order to meet the requirements of this portfolio 
limit, a fund must satisfy the Value at Risk (“VaR”)-based test.149 The test fo-
cuses on derivative use rather than exclusively a fund’s exposure.150 After 
                                                                                                                           
ings and insurance of debt or preferred shares a closed-end fund or business development company. 
Id. at 82 n.194. 
 144 Id. at 82. 
 145 Id. at 80. Netting is the when a trader can “aggregate reciprocal claims.” Adam R. Waldman, 
OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1023, 1059 (1994). For example, if Trader A entered into two transactions with Trader B and 
Trader A was owed $100 from one transaction with Trader B and was indebted $50 from the second 
transaction with Trader B, netting would allow Trader B to give Trader A $50. See id. The netting 
provision would generally apply to situations where a fund uses an offsetting transaction to settle a 
transaction before its maturity or expiration. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 80. 
 146 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 81. Netting can only be undertaken when the instruments 
used by each party are the same and the underlying asset of the contracts are the same. Id. The Pro-
posed Rule does not define material terms. Id. at 414–19 (providing the definitions section of the 
proposed rule). 
 147 Id. at 110. Cover transactions were permitted by the SEC through the Dreyfus No-Action 
Letter. Dreyfus No-Action Letter, supra note 97, at 2. Difficulty in providing an appropriate standard, 
imperfect hedges, and the complicated nature of some offsetting transactions, were cited as reasons to 
why the SEC did not deem them fit for the calculation. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 111–14. The 
SEC found that due to the fact that most funds in the DERA White Paper study did not exceed the 
150% limit, additional reductions were not needed. Id. at 111. 
 148 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 115. The SEC concluded that the Value-at-Risk (“VaR”) 
test was the best choice to measure risk because it allows portfolio risk to be measured consistently 
and its ability to measure the effect holding a certain position on market risk. See id. at 119–21. Addi-
tionally, the SEC found that funds are already likely to have the capacity to conduct the VaR test. See 
id. at 123. 
 149 Id. at 115–16. The SEC defines market risk as the risk of financial loss resulting from changes 
in market prices. See id. at 116 n.249. The definition includes general market risk—the risks connect-
ed to the market as a whole—and specific market risk—the risk connected with changes in the price 
of the underlying asset. Id; see Michael S. Bennett & Michael J. Marin, The Casablanca Paradigm: 
Regulatory Risk in the Asian Financial Derivatives Markets, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 6 n.37 
(1999) (defining “market risk”). 
 150 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 117; see supra notes 128–144 and accompanying text 
(discussing exposure calculation). This is in contrast to the exposure-based portfolio limitation, which 
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passing the VaR test, the fund must calculate its exposure and be within the 
exposure limitation of 300% of the fund’s net assets.151 
VaR is an estimate of potential losses on an instrument or portfolio, ex-
pressed in positive dollars, over a stipulated time horizon, and at a certain con-
fidence level.152 The VaR test requires that, after the fund enters into a senior 
securities transaction, the fund’s full portfolio VaR be lower than the fund’s 
securities VaR.153 Full portfolio VaR is defined to include securities, deriva-
tives transactions, and other investments.154 Securities VaR is the full portfolio 
minus any derivatives transactions.155 
Fund calculations of VaR are limited by specific model and parameters 
requirements.156 A fund’s model must incorporate all significant, identifiable 
                                                                                                                           
does exclusively measure exposure. See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 117. VaR is generally a 
determination of potential losses. See HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 523–24. 
 151 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 116. The exposure calculation that a risk-based portfolio 
limitation uses is identical to that of the exposure-based portfolio limitation. See id. at 414 (presenting 
section 4(c)(3), the calculation method for determining exposure); see also notes 146–160 and accom-
panying text (explaining the exposure calculation). The 300% limitation would help to relieve con-
cerns about VaR limitations while still allowing funds to use the flexibility of VaR. Proposing Re-
lease, supra note 4, at 146. 
 152 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 119 (citing to Proposed Rule 18f-4(c)(11)(i)(A)). This 
definition comports with other regulatory definitions and scholarly literature. See id. A time horizon, 
measured in days, is the length of time the investment is held. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 523–24. 
A confidence level, expressed as a percentage, is the certainty that a loss will occur. Id. at 523–24. It is 
used across the industry to provide a single number that quantifies total risk. Id. at 522. Essentially, it 
presents a number representing the worst-case scenario. See id. at 523. The SEC addresses the fact 
that VaR has limitations, chiefly its inability to reflect tail risks and its tendency to miscalculate loss 
under stressed market conditions. See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 126–29. 
 153 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 118. For example, a fund with a Securities VaR of $10 
million wishes to hedge with certain swaps. See id. If the full portfolio VaR of the fund is less than 
$10 million after purchasing the swaps, the fund meets the risk-based VaR test. See id. at 124. 
 154 Id. at 118. Other investments would include securities and investments that the fund has within 
its portfolio. Id. 
 155 Id. at 118–19. Derivatives transactions would not include derivatives transactions that do not 
have future payment obligations. Id. at 119 n.253. A fund that has a portfolio VaR that is greater than 
its securities VaR will presumably be using derivatives in a manner that decreases overall exposure to 
market risk. Id. at 122. 
 156 Id. at 134. There are many different models that funds use when computing VaR. See BNY 
MELLON, RISK ROADMAP: HEDGE FUNDS AND INVESTORS’ EVOLVING APPROACH TO RISK 1, 16 
(Aug. 2012), https://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/sites/default/files/riskroadmap.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2VU2-6YT4] (finding that funds use multiple models). See generally Christopher Culp et al., Value 
at Risk: Uses and Abuses, 10 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 26, 26–38 (1998) (exploring the vast amount of 
uses of VaR by many different financial institutions). A fund would not be limited to using historical 
simulation and could choose from Monte Carlo and parametric models as well. Proposing Release, 
supra note 4, at 135–36. Historical simulation requires the creation of a database that is composed of 
daily movements in market variables during a period of time. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 546. 
Three years of historical data would be required to estimate historical VaR, if the fund uses historical 
simulation See id. at 137. Monte Carlo simulation uses hypothetical changes in market values and 
simulates profits and losses. See Kate Litvak, Monte Carlo Simulation of Contractual Provisions: An 
Application to Default Provisions in Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, 98 CORNELL 
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market risks factors.157 In calculating VaR, the confidence interval must be a 
minimum of 99%.158 The time horizon used must be not less than ten and not 
more than twenty days.159 Finally, the fund must apply its VaR model consist-
ently between the securities and portfolio VaR in order to prevent a fund from 
using different models to attain greater exposure.160 
C. Asset Segregation Requirements for Derivatives Transactions  
and Additional Provisions 
1. Asset Segregation 
With the intent of directly addressing § 1(b)(8) of the ICA’s asset cover-
age concerns triggered by current fund practices, Proposed Rule 18f-4 requires 
adherence to asset segregation requirements.161 Under this requirement, a fund 
must preserve an amount of liquid assets to a sum, calculated by adding the 
mark-to-market coverage amount and the risk-based coverage amount, that 
would allow the fund to meet obligations incurred from derivatives transac-
tions.162 The coverage amount for derivatives transactions must be equal to the 
sum of: (1) the mark-to-market coverage amount or the amount that would be 
payable by the fund if the fund were to exit the derivatives transaction at the 
time of determination and (2) the risk-based amount or a “reasonable estimate” 
of the “potential amount payable by the fund were to exit the derivatives trans-
action under stressed conditions.”163 
                                                                                                                           
L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2013) (defining Monte Carlo simulation). Parametric models estimate key pa-
rameters to create hypothetical returns. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at n.293. 
 157 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 135. These risk factors include, but are not limited to, 
equity price risk, interest rate risk, credit spread risk, foreign currency risk, and commodity price risk. Id. 
These risks account for changes in the value of an asset held. Id. A fund would also need to address risks 
from “nonlinear price characteristics” for derivatives that have “embedded optionality.” Id. 
 158 Id. at 138. This is also called a one-tailed confidence level. Id. at 138 n.302. 
 159 Id. at 139. This calculation deviates from typical time parameters that only reflect the period 
an investment is being held. Id. By having such a time horizon, the SEC is attempting to balance short 
time horizons that are inefficient in identifying VaR risk fluctuations and longtime horizons that could 
cause estimated losses to drop. Id. at 139–40. 
 160 Id. at 142. Inconsistent use could allow a fund to change the results of the test and allow the 
fund to use derivatives in a manner inconsistent with the proposed rule. Id. 
 161 Id. at 153. Asset segregation was first addressed in Release 10666. See Release 10666, supra 
note 4, at 25,132 (covering asset segregation). 
 162 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 156; see supra note 103 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing mark-to-market). The required assets would need to be those liquid assets that the Proposed Rule has 
defined as qualified. Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 178. Unlike the previous practice proscribed by 
Release 10666, funds would not be required to place qualifying assets in a separate segregated account. 
See id. at 179 n.366; Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128. The term segregate is now meant to 
mean that the qualifying coverage amounts are identified as such on the fund’s books. Proposing Re-
lease, supra note 4, at 179 n.366. 
 163 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 156. A similar requirement would exist under Proposed 
Rule 18f-4 for financial commitment transactions. Id. at 228. The SEC defines financial commitment 
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Under the mark-to-market coverage amount, calculations would need to 
be done daily.164 A fund may net its payment obligations and use assets that are 
variation margin or collateral to reduce the required coverage amount.165 
The more flexible risk-based coverage amount is meant to measure the 
amount of assets needed in the event of stressed market conditions that led to 
future losses.166 Under the risk-based coverage amount, calculations would 
also need to be done once daily in conjunction with the mark-to-mark daily 
calculation.167 The calculations allow for netting and margin or collateral to 
reduce the required coverage amount.168 
The actual characterization of the qualifying coverage assets required to 
meet the total amount calculated by the mark-to-market and risk-based cover-
age amounts must fall under two categories: “cash and cash equivalents” or the 
particular asset that could satisfy an obligation under a derivative transaction 
that required the particular asset to be delivered.169 
                                                                                                                           
transactions under Proposed Rule 18f-4 as any firm or standby commitment agreement or similar agree-
ment, any reverse repurchase agreement, or short sale borrowing. Id. at 229. Financial commitment obli-
gation under Proposed Rule 18f-4 is defined as the amount of cash or other assets that the fund is condi-
tionally or unconditionally obligated to pay or deliver under a financial commitment transaction. Id. 
Where the fund is conditionally or unconditionally obligated to deliver a particular asset, the financial 
commitment obligation under the proposed rule would equal the value of the asset. Id. Only specific 
assets qualify as coverage assets for financial commitment transactions. Id. Assets that would be deemed 
to be sufficient under the proposed rule would be: (1) cash and cash equivalents; (2) with respect to any 
financial commitment transaction under which the fund may satisfy its obligations under the transaction 
by delivering a particular asset, that particular asset; or (3) assets that are convertible to cash or that will 
generate cash, equal in amount to the financial commitment obligation. Id. The rule limits the use of 
these transactions by funds by requiring that the funds cover each transaction with an equal qualifying 
asset. Id. In other words, each financial commitment transaction would need to be covered with a value 
that is equal to the amount of the financial commitment obligation associated with the transaction. Id. 
 164 Id. at 158. Funds may choose to calculate more than once daily. Id. at 66 n.335. 
 165 Id. at 160–61. Netting is the “ability to offset contracts with positive and negative values in the 
event of a counterparty default.” HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 868; see also supra note 49 and ac-
companying text (explaining margin account). 
 166 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 166–67. The SEC concluded that this measurement was 
necessary due to a finding that the mark-to-market coverage amount would not adequately measure 
future loss. Id. at 166. The fund’s board would need to determine procedures for the risk-based cover-
age amount. Id. at 167. 
 167 Id. at 166. The risk-based coverage amount is a new addition to the coverage amount calcula-
tion set out in Release 10666. See Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128. 
 168 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 171–73. These calculations are determined the same way 
as the mark-to-market coverage amount is determined. Id. 
 169 Id. at 178. The total amount of “coverage assets could not exceed the fund’s net assets.” Id. at 
183. The SEC posits that allowing a fund to maintain additional coverage assets could allow a fund to 
maintain a greater amount of leverage. Id. at 184–85. Cash and cash equivalents are considered quali-
fied due to their extremely liquid nature. Id. at 179. Cash equivalents include short-term, highly liquid 
investments that are easily turned into cash, such as treasury bills, agency securities, bank deposits, 
commercial paper, and shares of money market funds. Id. Deliverable assets are the particular assets 
that would satisfy an obligation but not a derivative that provides offsetting exposure. Id. at 182. The 
SEC prohibits such offsetting to be considered as qualifying because there is counterparty risk and a 
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2. Derivatives Risk Management Program 
Funds that exceed the threshold of fifty percent notional derivatives expo-
sure or that use any complex derivatives would also be required to maintain a 
formal derivatives risk management program.170 A fund’s program would be 
required to have policies and procedures that: (1) assess the risks of derivatives 
transactions that the fund has entered into; (2) manage derivatives risks 
through monitoring of derivatives use and communication with fund manage-
ment; (3) segregate program functions from portfolio management; and (4) 
review and update the risk management program.171 
First, a fund must evaluate the risks associated with the use of derivatives 
transactions through identifying the derivatives it currently in use and those it 
plans to use in the future.172 The fund must then evaluate five risks related to 
the derivative.173 Second, the fund must establish policies and procedures that 
align with the fund or its investment advisor’s investment guide.174 The fund 
would be required to inform the portfolio manager of derivatives risks.175 
Third, the functions related to the administration of the risk management pro-
gram would need to be reasonably segregated from those related to portfolio 
                                                                                                                           
fund could end up with insufficient assets to cover its obligations. Id. Counterparty risk is the risk of 
default. Id. at 207–08. 
 170 Id. at 190. The 50% requirement mirrors the 50% threshold set out in § 18 of the ICA that 
limits fund borrowing from banks. Id. at 193–94. Complex derivatives are deemed to have special risk 
characteristics that the SEC believes require greater attention in order to facilitate safe use. Id. at 200. 
 171 Id. at 191. A titled derivatives risk manager would run the program. Id. In addition to the re-
quired elements, the proposed rule specifies certain requirements for the administration of the program. 
Id. at 221. A board-approved individual within the fund would need to be charged with administering the 
program’s policies and procedures See id. The board, along with a majority of uninterested directors, 
must approve of the derivatives risk manager. Id. This individual would need independence to adminis-
ter the program. Id. at 222. Furthermore, the fund’s board would need to have an understanding of the 
program’s objectives as well as approve the program, approve any material changes to the program, and 
review the derivatives risk manager. Id. at 225–27. 
 172 Id. at 205. 
 173 Id. at 205–06. The fund must evaluate five stated risks but can choose to identify other poten-
tial risks. Id. at 210. The first risk to be identified is leverage risk, which includes the risks connected to 
the magnification of “effects by changes in market value underlying derivatives transactions where the 
value of the underlying asset exceeds the initial investment.” Id. The second risk is market risk, which 
includes the risk related to possible adverse market changes that may impact derivative returns and 
obligations. Id. at 207–08. The third risk is counterparty risk, which is the risk that a counterparty de-
faults on its obligation and the related risk of having many derivatives transactions with one counter-
party. Id. at 208. The fourth risk is liquidity risk. Id. at 209. Liquidity risk is the risk that a fund could 
not meet requests to redeem shares issued by the fund that are expected under normal conditions with-
out materially affecting the fund’s net asset value. Id. The final risk is operational risk, which is the risk 
associated with documentation issues, settlement issues, system failures, and human error. Id. at 210. 
 174 Id. at 212. The fund would not be required to impose risk limits. Id. A fund might consider 
written guidelines at revisiting contingency plans. Id. at 214. 
 175 Id. at 215. As risks present themselves or are anticipated, those risks would need to be report-
ed to the portfolio manager. Id. 
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management.176 Lastly, the fund would be required to annually review its poli-
cies and procedures to evaluate the efficiency of the program and update the 
program as necessary.177 
3. Recordkeeping 
Proposed Rule 18f-4 would also require funds to comply with record-
keeping requirements that mandate the disclosure of information relating to the 
compliance with the portfolio limitations, asset segregation, and the formalized 
risk management program requirements.178 These records would need to be 
easily accessible for five years for examiners to evaluate compliance.179 
4. Amendments to Proposed Forms 
The final adjustments to current regulations that Proposed Rule 18f-4 
would make are the amendments to two of the SEC’s proposed forms.180 
Amendments to Proposed Form N-PORT include the addition of fund’s gamma 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Id. at 216. The SEC intends the segregation to be a way to independently assess risk, cross 
check portfolio management, and “enhance the protections provided by the program.” Id. at 216–17. 
Without such a separation, the risk management program could be harmed by a lack of checks and bal-
ances. Id. at 217. A variety of methods could be used to sufficiently segregate. Id. Communication 
between the two managements would still be allowed, however, as the SEC believes that such communi-
cation would be key to the program’s success. Id. The SEC proposes that a “firewall” be in place be-
tween the two managers. Id. The SEC believes that this could create issues for entities that have a 
limited number of employees. Id. at 217 n.435. 
 177 Id. at 218. The SEC requires review of models, measurement tools, and policies and proce-
dures. Id. The SEC believes that a fund should consider reviewing more than once per year. Id. 
 178 Id. at 246. The recordkeeping requirement consists of three major provisions that provide that a 
fund maintain records relating to: (1) the fund’s chosen portfolio limitation; (2) compliance with other 
requirements; and (3) the risk management program if a fund is required to maintain one. Id. at 246–47. 
Under the first provision, the fund would need to have records of the determination of which portfolio 
limitation, either the exposure-based portfolio limitation or the risk-based limitation. Id. at 247. Changes 
to portfolio limitations and the initial determination would need to be recorded for SEC examiners to 
evaluate. Id. Under the second provision, funds would be required to maintain written records of its com-
pliance with requirements. Id. at 227–28. The fund would need a written record of its maintenance of 
qualifying coverage amounts, compliance with portfolio limitations, and the fund’s mark-to-market and 
risk-based coverage amounts. Id. at 228. Further, the fund would need to have written records of senior 
securities transactions “immediately after entering into” such a transaction, its full portfolio VaR, and its 
securities VaR. Id. For derivatives transactions, the fund would need to have written records of the total 
amount of coverage amounts rather than the assets maintained for each specific derivatives transaction. 
Id. Such records would need to be compiled daily in conjunction with the coverage amount calculations. 
Id. Under the third provision, funds would be required to possess records of its derivatives risk manage-
ment program. Id. at 249. The fund would need to maintain written records of the program’s policies and 
procedures, materials relating to the approval of the program, and documents relating to the periodic 
updates and review of the program. Id. 
 179 Id. at 247. 
 180 Id. at 251. These forms were proposed on May 20, 2015, in an attempt to modernize fund 
disclosure. Investment Company Reporting Modernization, supra note 18, at 1. 
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and vega for certain instruments.181 The Amendments to Proposed Form N-CEN 
requires that funds identify which portfolio limitation that they have chosen.182 
III. PROPOSED RULE 18F-4 IS NECESSARY BUT MUST SPECIFICALLY 
ADDRESS SPECULATIVE DERIVATIVE USE TO ALIGN  
REGULATIONS WITH THE ICA 
The systemic and specific risks to investors that derivatives use poses are 
well documented.183 The exponential expansion of the overall derivatives mar-
ket and the increase in use by funds, however, strongly suggest that derivatives 
are still highly valued financial instruments.184 This Part argues that, although 
the political tide is turning against regulation, the SEC has a duty to implement 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 250. Proposed Form N-PORT originally just maintained a 
delta requirement. Id. at 254. Delta is the rate of change of the price of a derivative with the price of 
the underlying asset. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 860. Gamma “measures the sensitivity of delta.” 
Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 255; HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 864 (stating that gamma is 
the “rate of change of delta with respect to the asset price”). Vega measures the “amount that an op-
tions contract’s price changes in relation to a 1% change in the volatility of an underlying asset.” Pro-
posing Release, supra note 4, at 255. Volatility is the measured uncertainty of the return realized on an 
asset. HULL & BASU, supra note 1, at 875. 
 182 Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 256. 
 183 See In re Claymore Advisors, LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 30308 (Dec. 19, 
2012) (involving a fund that lost 45% of its assets due and eventual liquidation due to derivative use); 
In re UBS Willow Management L.L.C. and UBS Fund Advisor L.L.C., Investment Company Act 
Release No. 31869 (Oct. 16, 2015) (settled action) (involving a fund that was forced to liquidate after 
derivative use led to immense losses); OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 9, at 19 (finding that cur-
rent use of derivatives pose risks to financial stability); RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 160 (ex-
plaining AIG and Bear Stern’s derivative losses); Baker, supra note 9, at 1292 (arguing for more 
transparency of derivative use due to their possible systemic impact); Markham, supra note 90, at 361 
(finding that several mutual funds saw great losses in the 1990s due to derivative use); Simkovic, 
supra note 9, at 14 (arguing that there should be greater regulation of OTC derivatives); Dieterich & 
Banerji, supra note 91, at 1 (covering a $600 million loss incurred by a mutual fund’s use of deriva-
tives); Dizard, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that the OTC derivative market is under collateralized at 
about $3.69 trillion despite efforts to use central clearing); Edwards, supra note 6, at 9–13 (explaining 
the circumstances behind Metallgesellschaft’s losses); Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 56, at 2 (covering 
J.P. Morgan’s over $2 billion loss caused by derivative use); Valladares, supra note 9, at 1 (highlight-
ing the concentration of derivatives in few financial institutions); Partnoy Testimony, supra note 6, at 
58–62 (outlining how Enron traders used derivatives to hide losses). 
 184 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 4 (acknowledging the beneficial uses of derivatives); 
BIS, EXCHANGE-TRADED FUTURES, supra note 1, at 1 (providing statistics on the 2016 derivative 
market size and showing that the derivatives market has septupled in size since the 1990s); 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 159 (stating that derivatives are a means to shift risk to parties who 
are willing to take it on or are better suited to take it on); Sill, supra note 11, at 20 (explaining that 
derivatives aid in risk allocation); Tian, supra note 12, at 1 (arguing that derivatives are an important 
function of the market to maintain efficient risk allocation); Valladares, supra note 9, at 2 (highlight-
ing some of the major developments in growth); Michael S. Gibson, Credit Derivatives and Risk 
Management 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Working Paper 
No. 47, 2007) (“The growth of credit derivatives suggests that market participants find them useful for 
risk management.”); Antoniewicz, supra note 10 (arguing that there are many benefits for derivatives 
and that derivatives risk can be overstated when simple measurements are used). 
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Proposed Rule 18f-4 given the possible risks to investors.185 The Proposed 
Rule, however, must take the additional step of eliminating speculative deriva-
tive use in order to align regulations with the ICA.186 Section A asserts that 
Proposed Rule 18f-4 is a necessary rule given the ICA’s policy of protecting 
the national public and investors and derivatives’ documented risks to the fi-
nancial system and investors.187 Section B asserts that, in regulating their use, 
the SEC should make a greater distinction between derivatives used for specu-
lation purposes and derivatives used for hedging.188 
A. 18f-4 Is a Necessary Starting Point for Fund Use of Derivatives 
The stated policy of the ICA requires that its provisions be interpreted to 
“eliminate the conditions” that have an adverse effect on the “national public 
interest and the interest of investors.”189 Not only has derivatives use been 
found to pose systemic risk, but research also suggests that funds are institu-
tions whose failure could have an impact on the greater financial system.190 
These public funds are invested in by unsophisticated and unaccredited inves-
tors who possess neither the knowledge nor the assets to be exposed to the 
risks of derivatives use.191 Exactly to what extent funds use derivatives is also 
not well documented.192 The SEC must act on its Congressionally mandated 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See infra notes 189–225 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra notes 189–208 and accompanying text. 
 187 See infra notes 209–221 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra notes 222–225 and accompanying text. 
 189 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012). 
 190 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 7, at 279 (concluding that the massive losses of 
major financial institutions were due to derivatives); FIN. STABILITY BD., PROPOSED POLICY RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO ADDRESS STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITIES FROM ASSET MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
1–2 (2016) (laying out the financial stability risks that certain asset management firms pose); OFF. OF 
FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 9, at 18–19 (finding that current use of derivatives pose risks to financial 
stability and that large asset management firms could pose risks to the financial system); Adam & 
Guettler, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that the use of certain derivatives caused substantial losses at banks 
and funds during the 2008 Financial Crisis). 
 191 See CLIFFORD J. ALEXANDER & ARTHUR C. DELIBERT, MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE 
GUIDE ¶ 710, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2015) (outlining the public nature of investment com-
panies under the ICA); Paul Justice, Warning: Leveraged and Inverse ETFs Kill Portfolios, MORN-
INGSTAR, Jan. 22, 2009 (finding that investors do not understand derivative laden products); Charlie 
Wells, An Alternative Investment by Any Other Name Is Still . . . , WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-alternative-investment-by-any-other-name-is-still-1439172115 
[https://perma.cc/NGU2-4RL3] (finding that some mutual fund brokers avoid the use of the word 
“derivatives” when marketing to investors because of the lack of understanding); supra note 62 and 
accompanying text (laying out investor requirements under the ICA). 
 192 See DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 3 (finding that accessible data on derivative use by funds is 
not available); Piwowar Statement, supra note 19, at 2 (stating that he could not support the proposed 
rule because the SEC did not do a high-quality analysis of comprehensive data on fund use of deriva-
tives). 
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duty and use its powers to bring derivatives under the purview of the ICA 
through enacting Proposed Rule 18f-4.193 
Fund derivative use poses substantial dangers to the national public be-
cause of the systemic risks involved with derivatives and the outsized role of 
funds in the financial system.194 The 2008 Financial Crisis clearly enumerated 
the systemic risks that derivatives pose to the national public.195 Funds are in-
stitutions that maintain important positions in the financial system.196 The fact 
that 45% of fund assets are concentrated in the largest five complexes makes 
fund use of derivatives especially dangerous.197 The growth of fund use of de-
rivatives has continued for over a decade, but the fund industry has seen a re-
cent influx of competitive tactics and the entrance of investment banks—
developments that may increase the likelihood of funds to seek out alternate 
strategies that use derivatives in order to maximize returns.198 In a very recent 
                                                                                                                           
 193 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, a-38 (stating the policy of the ICA and granting the SEC the power to 
make necessary rules under the ICA); FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 190, at 1–2 (laying out the fi-
nancial stability risks that certain asset management firms pose); OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 
9, at 18–19 (finding that current use of derivatives poses risks to financial stability and that large asset 
management firms could pose risks to the financial system). The current political climate is against 
regulation. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (requiring that two existing 
regulations must be identified as to be repealed when an agency or executive department proposes for 
notice and comment); Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017) (setting out the 
“Core Principles” of regulation for the Trump administration and order the Financial Stability Council 
to report on current regulations); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (addressing regulatory 
policy changes). 
 194 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 7, at 279 (concluding that the massive losses of 
major financial institutions were due to derivatives); FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 190, at 1–2 (laying 
out the financial stability risks that asset management firms pose); Adam & Guettler, supra note 7, at 1 
(stating that the use of certain derivatives caused substantial losses at banks and funds during the Finan-
cial Crisis); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing systemic risk). 
 195 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 7, at 279 (concluding that the massive losses of 
major financial institutions were due to derivatives); Lynch, supra note 14, at 84–94 (covering the dan-
gers of derivative use); Adam & Guettler, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that the use of certain derivatives 
caused substantial losses at banks and funds during the Financial Crisis); Sheri M. Markose, Systemic 
Risk from Global Financial Derivatives: A Network Analysis of Contagion and Its Mitigation with 
Super-Spreader Tax 47–48 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 12/282, 2012) (finding that deriva-
tives systemic risk was evident in the Financial Crisis); McDonald & Paulson, supra note 7, at 12–18 
(explaining AIG’s derivative use). 
 196 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 643 (explaining the importance of funds); KIRSCH, 
supra note 26, §§ 1:1, 1B:1 (highlighting the importance of funds); supra notes 60–79 and accompa-
nying text (discussing funds and their role in the markets). 
 197 INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 17 (covering the concentration of assets); see Adam & Guet-
tler, supra note 7, at 1 (finding that concentration of derivative use increases systemic risk). The largest 
twenty-five complexes control 75% of assets. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 17. Additionally, alt-
hough data on fund use of derivatives is incomplete, the risks of leverage are very well known through 
ties to the Great Depression and the 2008 Financial Crisis. See DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 3 (finding 
that accessible data on derivative use by funds is not available). 
 198 See DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2–3 n.7 (finding that there has been an increase in fund use 
of derivatives over the past decade); Krouse, supra note 73, at 1 (covering a new move by an asset 
manager to obtain more flexibility in selecting fund managers); Loder, supra note 73, at 1 (highlight-
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incident of fund use of derivatives under current regulations, the market felt 
substantial tremors as a single fund lost $600 million due to options trading.199 
Individual investors in funds are often unsophisticated and likely have 
neither the knowledge to comprehend nor the assets to sustain the risks of de-
rivatives.200 It is, therefore, against the policy of the ICA to allow individual 
investors to be exposed to such risks.201 Indeed, even scholars and practitioners 
struggle with understanding derivatives.202 There is also no minimum income 
or net worth requirement for investors in funds.203 But, the assets managed by 
funds are particularly important to individuals in that an immense amount of 
retirement assets, with sixty-three percent of 401(k)’s under management of 
funds.204 With some fund use of derivatives mirroring that of private funds, 
individual investors in funds are exposed to risks that should be contained to 
more sophisticated hedge fund investors.205 
The SEC should move to emplace regulations while continuing to gather 
data on fund derivative use so as to properly regulate derivatives under the 
ICA, a move not entirely objected to by the industry.206 The SEC cannot con-
                                                                                                                           
ing the recent entrance of investment banks into the ETF market and that Goldman Sachs, an invest-
ment bank, maintains prices lower than those of ETFs already in a market controlled by Vanguard, 
BlackRock, and State Street); Moise, supra note 73, at 1 (outlining the new “pricing war” between 
asset managers for the trading of ETFs); Popper, supra note 73, at 1 (covering a new ETF asset class 
that an asset manager attempted to use); Zweig, supra note 73, at 1 (covering developments in ETF 
and mutual fund use of electronic fund advisors). 
 199 See Dieterich & Banerji, supra note 91, at 1; supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining 
the fund loss). 
 200 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 119 (1953) (laying out the sophisticated investor 
requirements); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2017) (defining “accredited investor”); Justice, supra note 191, at 
1 (finding that investors do not understand derivative laden products); Wells, supra note 191, at 1 
(finding that some mutual fund brokers avoid the use of the word “derivatives” when marketing to 
investors because of the lack of understanding). 
 201 See Wells, supra note 191, at 1 (finding that some mutual fund brokers avoid the use of the 
word “derivatives” when marketing to investors because of the lack of understanding); supra note 62 
and accompanying text (laying out investor requirements under the ICA). 
 202 See Awrey, supra note 3, at 271–73 (explaining some particularly complex derivative uses by 
funds); Lynch, supra note 14, at 9 (explaining that many practitioners misunderstand derivatives); 
Stout, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 203 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012) (failing to state income or net worth threshold 
requirements for investors to purchase shares of a fund). 
 204 See KIRSCH, supra note 26, § 1A:2.5[C]. Currently, over 43% of U.S. households invest in 
mutual funds. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 112. 
 205 See DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2 (finding that some funds use derivatives in a similar man-
ner to hedge funds); INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 42 (finding an increase in alternative strategy 
funds). Alternative strategy funds often use hedge fund strategies of hedging risk. See Singer, supra 
note 85, at 498 (same); Horejs, supra note 85, at 2 (explaining alternative strategy funds). The Cata-
lyst Futures incident occurred when a hedge fund converted to a mutual fund and maintained its hedge 
fund derivative strategies. Dieterich & Banerji, supra note 91, at 1. 
 206 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, a-38 (stating the policy of the ICA and granting the SEC the power to 
make necessary rules under the ICA); Fidelity Comment Letter, supra note 19, at 2 (supporting updat-
ed regulations); FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 190, at 1–2; OFF. OF FIN. RESEARCH, supra note 9, at 
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tinue to rely on Release 10666 and subsequent no-action letters, all of which 
do not directly address derivative use and are loosely interpreted to the detri-
ment of some funds.207 The Proposed Rule’s portfolio limitations and asset 
segregation would serve to limit fund exposure to derivatives use and, thus, 
curb both the systemic and individual risks pose.208 Additionally, the Proposed 
Rule can help collect the data needed to determine exactly the extent to which 
funds use derivatives.209 
B. Properly Aligning Proposed Rule 18f-4’s Portfolio Limitations with the 
ICA’s Undue Speculation Policy 
The SEC should make a distinction between derivatives used for hedging 
and derivatives used for speculation in order to properly align Proposed Rule 
18f-4 with the ICA’s policy to eliminate undue speculation.210 Derivative use 
with the intention of hedging assets or other derivatives transactions maintains 
value for the entire financial system.211 Hedging through derivatives can de-
                                                                                                                           
18–19; Maxey, supra note 20, at 1 (finding that funds generally supported an update of regulations); 
Michaels, supra note 20, at 1 (quoting the Chief Executive of the Investment Company Institute as 
believing that “a well-drawn up rule on derivatives would be a good one”); Piwowar Statement, supra 
note 19, at 1 (stating the need for updated regulations). 
 207 See BlackRock, Comment Letter on Use of Derivatives by Investment Companies Under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (Nov. 4, 2011) (on file with SEC) (“Any set of mechanical rules 
cannot take account of the diversity of derivatives and the multiplicity of ways they may be used by 
portfolio managers.”); Davis Polk, Comment Letter on Use of Derivatives by Investment Companies 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Nov. 11, 2011) (on file with SEC) (stating that “funds 
and their sponsors may interpret the available guidance differently, even when applying it to the same 
instruments, which may unfairly disadvantage some funds”); Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 19 
(listing the applicable no-action letters); Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128 (failing to explicitly 
address derivatives). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (failing to explicitly address deriva-
tives). Release 10666 is over thirty years old as of 2018 and was not created in anticipation of the evolu-
tion. See Release 10666, supra note 4, at 25,128; see also supra notes 113–125 and accompanying text 
(discussing the inapplicability of Release 10666 to address the current market). 
 208 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 69–151 (explaining the portfolio limitations and asset 
segregation requirements of Proposed Rule 18f-4); supra notes 126–158 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the portfolio requirements). 
 209 See DELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2–3 (finding that accessible data on derivative use by funds is 
not available); Piwowar Statement, supra note 19, at 1 (stating that he could not support the proposed 
rule because the SEC did not do a high-quality analysis of comprehensive data on fund use of deriva-
tives). 
 210 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012) (stating the policy of the ICA is to eliminate undue speculation); 
§ 80a-38 (granting the SEC the power to make necessary rules under the ICA); Proposing Release, 
supra note 4, at 111. The exposure-based portfolio limitation does not permit a fund to calculate hedging 
or cover transactions into the total notional amount. See id. at 111–14; see also supra notes 43–48 and 
accompanying text (explaining the benefits of hedging and the risks of speculative derivative use). 
 211 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 6 (1994) (finding that derivatives are important risk management tools for the 
functioning of global markets); HAAS, supra note 8, at 119 (explaining the useful use of derivative 
hedging); RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 159–60 (explaining that derivatives are a means to shift 
risk to parties who are willing to take it on or are better suited to take it on and that derivatives lower 
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crease risk to investors and absent a safe harbor for hedging transactions in the 
proposed rule, these valuable transactions could be discouraged.212 
Calculations of leverage caused by hedging may be difficult, but the SEC 
may curtail the beneficial and vital use of hedging if it does not allow for hedg-
ing to be added into the calculation.213 Conversely, speculative derivatives use 
neither provides efficient risk allocation nor creates any wealth.214 The portfo-
lio limitations should therefore distinguish between derivatives use for hedging 
and derivatives use for speculation and curtail speculative use through an Ex-
pected Shortfall calculation instead of VaR.215 In the alternative, speculative 
derivative use should be prohibited by funds entirely and then portfolio limita-
tions should be lifted to allow for greater hedging use.216 
                                                                                                                           
fund costs, allow for hedging, help manage assets, and increase profits); Frank D’Souza et al., Illumi-
nating the Need for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Mar-
ket, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 474 (2010) (stating that derivatives “can be used as a hedge against po-
tential losses from unpredictable changes in commodity and financial markets. As such, if used 
properly, derivatives are a good way of transferring risk”); Fletcher, supra note 43, at 818 (stating that 
derivatives “have become essential tools for risk management”); Macey, supra note 10, at 72–81 (stat-
ing that derivatives allow parties to shift risk); Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 221–22 (“These hedging 
strategies, at least theoretically, facilitate risk-spreading to parties better able to bear the risks . . . . 
This diversification of risk also reduces the likelihood that a default will cause any given institution to 
fail and mitigates the impact of any such failure on other institutions . . . .”); Sill, supra note 11, at 20 
(explaining that derivatives aid in risk allocation); see also supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text 
(explaining derivatives hedging). 
 212 See Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 43, at 195 (finding that hedging is 
vital to the marketplace); Lynch, supra note 14, at 18–19 (finding that derivatives used for hedging 
can create value by offering insurance). 
 213 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 110, 115–16; COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SEC., 
supra note 12, at 6; Tian, supra note 12, at 1. Risk management and risk sharing are considered the 
“primary purpose” of derivative use by mutual funds. See Tian, supra note 12, at 1. Difficulty in 
providing an appropriate standard, imperfect hedges, and the complicated nature of some offsetting trans-
actions were cited as reasons to why the SEC did not deem them fit for the calculation. See Proposing 
Release, supra note 4, at 110. Withholding cover transactions from the calculation could also lead to dis-
incentivizing funds from using these potentially beneficial transactions. See Tian, supra note 12, at 1. 
 214 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—Derivative Securi-
ties and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 
987, 994 (1992) (pointing out speculative derivative use’s similarities with gambling); Lynch, supra 
note 34, at 82–83 (explaining the particular dangers of derivatives speculation); Lynn A. Stout, Bet-
ting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and 
Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53, 57 (1995) (highlighting the much greater risk 
involved with speculative derivative use). Purely speculative derivatives are sometimes viewed as 
zero-sum transactions that do nothing more than transfer wealth. See Lynch, supra note 34, at 84. 
 215 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 110; Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transpar-
ent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293, 331–32 (2012) (explaining that expected shortfall calculates for the worst-
case scenarios for portfolio loss). The exposure-based portfolio limitation does not permit a fund to 
calculate hedging or cover transactions into the total notional amount. See Proposing Release, supra 
note 4, at 111–14. The SEC found that due to the fact that most funds in the DERA White Paper study 
did not exceed the 150% limit, additional reductions were not needed. See id. at 111. 
 216 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 111, 115–16; Hazen, supra note 214, at 994 (pointing 
out speculative derivative use’s similarities with gambling); Lynch, supra note 34, at 82–83 (explain-
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Under the first approach to portfolio limitations, speculative derivative use 
would be permitted but contained through an Expected Shortfall calculation of 
risk and hedging would be calculated into the exposure limitation.217 Such an 
approach would better align the Proposed Rule with the ICA because, by sepa-
rating speculative derivatives transactions from hedging transactions, undue 
speculation caused by derivative transactions could properly be constrained.218 
Generally, Expected Shortfall measures the total risk of loss in a portfolio 
and accounts for tail risk.219 It would replace the current VaR model in calcu-
lating for exposure, which only measures expected risk and fails to measure 
what is tail-end risk.220 VaR was shown to have significant failings under mar-
ket stress during the 2008 Financial Crisis and should not be used when at-
tempting to protect investors.221 The first approach would also allow for hedg-
ing to be calculated into the exposure limitations.222 Hedging can be distin-
guished from speculative derivative transactions by appropriately matching a 
derivatives transaction with the asset it is hedging.223 
The alternative approach to portfolio limitations entails banning all specu-
lative derivative use by funds and lifting portfolio limitations for hedging.224 
                                                                                                                           
ing the particular dangers of derivatives speculation); Stout, supra note 214, at 57 (highlighting the 
much greater risk involved with speculative derivative use). 
 217 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 110, 115–16; Bartlett, supra note 215, at 331–32. 
 218 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(7) (2012); Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 111. 
 219 See Bartlett, supra note 215, at 331–32 (explaining expected shortfall); John Hull, VAR Versus 
Expected Shortfall, RISK.NET (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/technical-paper/150
6669/var-versus-expected-shortfall [https://perma.cc/JX43-Q5KA] (outlining the benefits of using 
expected shortfall over VaR). 
 220 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 115–16; Culp et al., supra note 156, at 26 (exploring 
the deficiencies of VaR); Andrew L. McElroy, Drastic Times Call for Drastic Measures: Value-at-
Risk Is (Still) a Flawed Preventive of Financial Crises and What Regulators Can Do About It, 6 J. 
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 219, 224 (2013) (finding that “catastrophic losses” can be “hidden in 
the tail”). 
 221 See Suleyman Basak & Alexander Shapiro, Value-at-Risk- Based Risk Management: Optimal 
Policies and Asset Prices,14 REV. FIN. STUDIES 371, 390 (2001) (finding that risk managers that use 
VaR take on greater losses than those who do not use VaR); Pablo Triana, The Flaws of Value at Risk: 
Tracking a True Culprit, CORP. FIN. REV., July-Aug. 2009, at 1 (covering the flaws of VaR); Yasuhi-
ro Yamai & Toshinao Yoshiba, Comparative Analyses of Expected Shortfall and Value-at-Risk Under 
Market Stress, MONETARY & ECONOMIC STUDIES, Oct. 2002, at 183 (finding that prevalent use of 
VaR for risk management could lead to great losses). 
 222 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 111; RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 159–60 (ex-
plaining that derivatives are a means to shift risk to parties who are willing to take it on or are better 
suited to take it on and that derivatives lower fund costs, allow for hedging, help manage assets, and 
increase profits); Macey, supra note 10, at 72–81 (stating that derivatives allow parties to shift risk). 
 223 See BlackRock, Comment Letter on Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies 
and Business Development Companies 18–19 (Mar. 28, 2016) (on file with SEC) (presenting a meth-
od of hedging calculation). This matching could be done by looking to the net exposures of the physi-
cal securities and derivatives transactions. See id. If, after calculating both net exposures, the physical 
securities and derivatives transactions are opposite signs the fund is using the derivative as a hedge 
and therefore excluded from the calculation. See id. 
 224 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 111, 115–16. 
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This approach would be safer and would more properly align the Proposed 
Rule with the ICA because the ICA’s policy is to “eliminate” undue specula-
tion.225 Although speculative derivatives use by funds would be completely 
barred, funds would be able to use hedging transactions with greater leeway.226 
The new asset segregation requirements would act as a sufficient backstop to 
hedging transactions that could maintain some speculative characteristics.227 
CONCLUSION 
Investment company use of derivatives continues to increase. Proposed 
Rule 18f-4 sets out long overdue and reasonable provisions to mitigate the 
risks involved with the continued increases of derivative use. Though there is 
now an anti-regulation wind blowing in government, Proposed Rule 18f-4 
should not be abandoned so as to prevent hazardous derivative use by regis-
tered funds. The rule should, however, allow for the beneficial use of hedging 
in its calculation of fund exposure to risks and use the calculation of tail-end 
risk in place of the VaR model. Such augmentations to the rule would allow 
funds to benefit from derivatives but track the greater risks that can follow. In 
the alternative, the Proposed Rule should entirely prohibit speculative deriva-
tives use and lift the portfolio limitations for hedging. Failing to emplace Pro-
posed Rule 18f-4 contravenes the SEC’s duty under the ICA to interpret its 
provisions to eliminate undue speculation. 
DAVID MILLER 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(7) (2012); Hazen, supra note 214, at 994 (pointing out speculative 
derivative use’s similarities with gambling); Lynch, supra note 34, at 82–83 (explaining the particular 
dangers of derivatives speculation). Stout, supra note 214, at 57 (highlighting the much greater risk 
involved with speculative derivative use). 
 226 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 159; HAAS, supra note 8, at 119 (explaining the useful 
use of derivative hedging); RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 9, at 159–60 (explaining that derivatives are 
a means to shift risk to parties who are willing to take it on or are better suited to take it on and that 
derivatives lower fund costs, allow for hedging, help manage assets, and increase profits); Macey, 
supra note 10, at 72–81 (stating that derivatives allow parties to shift risk). 
 227 See Proposing Release, supra note 4, at 159. Hedging, in the context of Credit Default Swaps, 
does not always result in a full mitigation of risk. See Fletcher, supra note 43, at 865 (stating that “a 
perfect hedge is almost impossible”); see also supra notes 159–176 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing asset segregation requirements). Indeed, the distinction between hedging and speculation can be 
difficult to distinguish, one author noting close to a century ago that “courts are between the devil and 
the deep sea” when making the distinction. See Patterson, supra note 43, at 878 (discussing the diffi-
culties with distinguishing between hedging and speculative derivative use). 
